Related papers: Co-evolution of strategy and structure in complex …
The study of evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions has been of interest to many different disciplines. Also local interactions with multiple opponents had been considered, although always for a fixed amount of players. In many…
Decision-making individuals often imitate their highest-earning fellows rather than optimize their own utilities, due to bounded rationality and incomplete information. Perpetual fluctuations between decisions have been reported as the…
Evolutionary game dynamics with two 2-strategy games in a finite population has been investigated in this study. Traditionally, frequency-dependent evolutionary dynamics are modeled by deterministic replicator dynamics under the assumption…
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on repeated interactions. When individuals meet repeatedly, they can use conditional strategies to enforce cooperative outcomes that would not be feasible in one-shot…
We consider a broad class of stochastic imitation dynamics over networks, encompassing several well known learning models such as the replicator dynamics. In the considered models, players have no global information about the game…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only…
We explore the coupled dynamics of the internal states of a set of interacting elements and the network of interactions among them. Interactions are modeled by a spatial game and the network of interaction links evolves adapting to the…
We study mechanisms of synchronisation, coordination, and equilibrium selection in two-player coordination games on multilayer networks. We apply the approach from evolutionary game theory with three possible update rules: the replicator…
The interdependence between an individual strategy decision and the resulting change of environmental state is often a subtle process. Feedback-evolving games have been a prevalent framework for studying such feedback in well-mixed…
Many growing networks possess accelerating statistics where the number of links added with each new node is an increasing function of network size so the total number of links increases faster than linearly with network size. In particular,…
Cooperative behaviors are deeply embedded in structured biological and social systems. Networks are often employed to portray pairwise interactions among individuals, where network nodes represent individuals and links indicate who…
Dynamics of a social population is analyzed taking into account some physical constraints on individual behavior and decision making abilities. The model, based on Evolutionary Game Theory, predicts that a population has to pass through a…
The complexity of interactions between networks and territories has been widely acknowledged empirically, in particular through the existence of circular causal relations in their co-development, that can be understood as a co-evolution.…
Creating new ties in a social network facilitates knowledge exchange and affects positional advantage. In this paper, we study the process, which we call network building, of establishing ties between two existing social networks in order…
We study network games in which players choose both the partners with whom they associate and an action level (e.g., effort) that creates spillovers for those partners. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts, extending standard…
Understanding the evolution of human social systems requires flexible formalisms for the emergence of institutions. Although game theory is normally used to model interactions individually, larger spaces of games can be helpful for modeling…
We introduce and solve a model which considers two coupled networks growing simultaneously. The dynamics of the networks is governed by the new arrival of network elements (nodes) making preferential attachments to pre-existing nodes in…
Here we study the effects of adopting different strategies against different opponent instead of adopting the same strategy against all of them in the prisoner dilemma structured in well-mixed populations. We consider an evolutionary…
We investigate some of the properties and extensions of a dynamic innovation network model recently introduced in \citep{koenig07:_effic_stabil_dynam_innov_networ}. In the model, the set of efficient graphs ranges, depending on the cost for…