Related papers: Stability of evolutionarily stable strategies in d…
We study evolutionary game dynamics in a well-mixed populations of finite size, N. A well-mixed population means that any two individuals are equally likely to interact. In particular we consider the average abundances of two strategies, A…
Periodic patterns in dynamical behaviours of biological models described by simple form differential delay equations are studied. Mathematical models are given by a class of scalar delay differential equations with a multiplicative time…
We study the coupled dynamics of two populations of random replicators by means of statistical mechanics methods, and focus on the effects of relative population size, strategy correlations and heterogeneities in the respective co-operation…
We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…
Evolutionary game theory is a common framework to study the evolution of cooperation, where it is usually assumed that the same game is played in all interactions. Here, we investigate a model where the game that is played by two…
Evolutionary spatial 2 x 2 games between heterogeneous agents are analyzed using different variants of cellular automata (CA). Agents play repeatedly against their nearest neighbors 2 x 2 games specified by a rescaled payoff matrix with two…
A local agglomeration of cooperators can support the survival or spreading of cooperation, even when cooperation is predicted to die out according to the replicator equation, which is often used in evolutionary game theory to study the…
Two families of denotational models have emerged from the semantic analysis of linear logic: dynamic models, typically presented as game semantics, and static models, typically based on a category of relations. In this paper we introduce a…
In Mean Field Games of Controls, the dynamics of the single agent is influenced not only by the distribution of the agents, as in the classical theory, but also by the distribution of their optimal strategies. In this paper, we study…
The prisoner's dilemma describes a conflict between a pair of players, in which defection is a dominant strategy whereas cooperation is collectively optimal. The iterated version of the dilemma has been extensively studied to understand the…
When interpersonal interactions between individuals are described by the (discrete or continuous) dynamical systems, the interactions are usually assumed to be instantaneous: the rates of change of the actual states of the actors at given…
Learning from a partner who collects higher payoff is a frequently used working hypothesis in evolutionary game theory. One of the alternative dynamical rules is when the focal player prefers to follow the strategy choice of the majority in…
We use analytical techniques based on an expansion in the inverse system size to study the stochastic evolutionary dynamics of finite populations of players interacting in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We show that a mechanism of…
We consider the lifetimes of metastable states in bistable evolutionary games (coordination games), and examine how they are affected by spatial structure. A semiclassical approximation based on a path integral method is applied to…
We introduce a non-diffusive spatial coupling term into the replicator equation of evolutionary game theory. The spatial flux is based on motion due to local gradients in the relative fitness of each strategy, providing a game-dependent…
This paper contains a reformulation of any $n$-player finite, static game into a framework of distributed, dynamical system based on agents' payoff-based deviations. The reformulation generalizes the method employed in the second part of…
The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away…
Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…
Cooperation and defection are social traits whose evolutionary origin is still unresolved. Recent behavioral experiments with humans suggested that strategy changes are driven mainly by the individuals' expectations and not by imitation.…
Evolutionary game theory has been successfully used to investigate the dynamics of systems, in which many entities have competitive interactions. From a physics point of view, it is interesting to study conditions under which a coordination…