Related papers: War of attrition with implicit time cost
We analyze inertial coordination games: dynamic coordination games with an endogenously changing state that depends on (i) a persistent fundamental players privately learn about over time; and (ii) past play. The speed of learning…
A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…
The best-response dynamics is an example of an evolutionary game where players update their strategy in order to maximize their payoff. The main objective of this paper is to study a stochastic spatial version of this game based on the…
Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where…
Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach to trust in when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we consider such behavior in atomic…
We investigate systematically the impact of human intervention in the training of computer players in a strategy board game. In that game, computer players utilise reinforcement learning with neural networks for evolving their playing…
We introduce a two-player model of reinforcement learning with memory. Past actions of an iterated game are stored in a memory and used to determine player's next action. To examine the behaviour of the model some approximate methods are…
Direct reciprocity facilitates the evolution of cooperation when individuals interact repeatedly. Most previous studies on direct reciprocity implicitly assume compulsory interactions. Yet, interactions are often voluntary in human…
We consider a version of large population games whose players compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. The system efficiency is measured by the variance of the decisions. In the regime where the system can be…
In the game of investment in the common good, the free rider problem can delay the stakeholders' actions in the form of a mixed strategy equilibrium. However, it has been recently shown that the mixed strategy equilibria of the stochastic…
Consider a system in which players at nodes of an underlying graph G repeatedly play Prisoner's Dilemma against their neighbors. The players adapt their strategies based on the past behavior of their opponents by applying the so-called…
Understanding the emergence and stability of cooperation in public goods games is important due to its applications in fields such as biology, economics, and social science. However, a gap remains in comprehending how mutations, both…
Understanding the evolution of human social systems requires flexible formalisms for the emergence of institutions. Although game theory is normally used to model interactions individually, larger spaces of games can be helpful for modeling…
We consider a stochastic game-theoretic model of an investment market in continuous time with short-lived assets and study strategies, called survival, which guarantee that the relative wealth of an investor who uses such a strategy remains…
We introduce a simple extension of the minority game in which the market rewards contrarian (resp. trend-following) strategies when it is far from (resp. close to) efficiency. The model displays a smooth crossover from a regime where…
We consider concurrent mean-payoff games, a very well-studied class of two-player (player 1 vs player 2) zero-sum games on finite-state graphs where every transition is assigned a reward between 0 and 1, and the payoff function is the…
Learning from a partner who collects higher payoff is a frequently used working hypothesis in evolutionary game theory. One of the alternative dynamical rules is when the focal player prefers to follow the strategy choice of the majority in…
Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals. The behaviour of such systems can be often described within game-theoretic models. In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental concepts…
Individual behaviors play an essential role in the dynamics of transmission of infectious diseases, including COVID--19. This paper studies a dynamic game model that describes the social distancing behaviors during an epidemic, assuming a…
Traditional solvable game theory and mean-field-type game theory (risk-aware games) predominantly focus on quadratic costs due to their analytical tractability. Nevertheless, they often fail to capture critical non-linearities inherent in…