Related papers: On the strategy frequency problem in batch Minorit…
We use the Minority Game and some of its variants to show how efficiency depends on learning in models of agents competing for limited resources. Exact results from statistical physics give a clear understanding of the phenomenology, and…
Mean field games (MFGs) model equilibria in games with a continuum of weakly interacting players as limiting systems of symmetric $n$-player games. We consider the finite-state, infinite-horizon problem with ergodic cost. Assuming Markovian…
We study a multi-agent decision problem in population games, where agents select from multiple available strategies and continually revise their selections based on the payoffs associated with these strategies. Unlike conventional…
We propose a new model of minority game with so-called smart agents such that the standard deviation and the total loss in this model reach the theoretical minimum values in the limit of long time. The smart agents use trail and error…
We show that the Minority Game, a model of interacting heterogeneous agents, can be described as a spin systems and it displays a phase transition between a symmetric phase and a symmetry broken phase where the games outcome is predicable.…
A minority game whose strategies are given by probabilities p, is replaced by a 'simplified' version that makes no use of memories at all. Numerical results show that the corresponding distribution functions are indistinguishable. A related…
We use generating functional analysis to study minority-game type market models with generalized strategy valuation updates that control the psychology of agents' actions. The agents' choice between trend following and contrarian trading,…
In this tutorial, we provide an introduction to machine learning methods for finding Nash equilibria in games with large number of agents. These types of problems are important for the operations research community because of their…
In this paper we present results and analyses of a class of games in which heterogeneous agents are rewarded for being in a minority group. Each agent possesses a number of fixed strategies each of which are predictors of the next minority…
We study a model of a competing population of N adaptive agents, with similar capabilities, repeatedly deciding whether to attend a bar with an arbitrary cutoff L. Decisions are based upon past outcomes. The agents are only told whether the…
We review the statistical mechanics approach to the study of the emerging collective behavior of systems of heterogeneous interacting agents. The general framework is presented through examples is such contexts as ecosystem dynamics and…
In this paper we introduce adaptation mechanism based on genetic algorithms in minority games. If agents find their performances too low, they modify their strategies in hope to improve their performances and become more successful. One aim…
We discuss the strategy that rational agents can use to maximize their expected long-term payoff in the co-action minority game. We argue that the agents will try to get into a cyclic state, where each of the $(2N +1)$ agent wins exactly…
This paper presents recent results from Mean Field Game theory underlying the introduction of common noise that imposes to incorporate the distribution of the agents as a state variable. Starting from the usual mean field games equations…
Semiotic dynamics is a novel field that studies how semiotic conventions spread and stabilize in a population of agents. This is a central issue both for theoretical and technological reasons since large system made up of communicating…
In this paper, we introduce a framework to study local interactions due to the presence of herding behavior in a minority game. The idea behind this approach is to consider that some of the agents who play the game believe that some of…
In lowest unique bid auctions, $N$ players bid for an item. The winner is whoever places the \emph{lowest} bid, provided that it is also unique. We use a grand canonical approach to derive an analytical expression for the equilibrium…
In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundance of the various strategies in the population. Here we study general games among n strategies in populations of large but finite size. We…
We explore a mechanism of decision-making in Mean Field Games with myopic players. At each instant, agents set a strategy which optimizes their expected future cost by assuming their environment as immutable. As the system evolves, the…
This paper studies a class of stationary mean-field games of singular stochastic control with regime-switching. The representative agent adjusts the dynamics of a Markov-modulated It\^o-diffusion via a two-sided singular stochastic control…