Related papers: Statistical equilibrium in simple exchange games I
We propose a new mean-field game model with two states to study synchronization phenomena, and we provide a comprehensive characterization of stationary and dynamic equilibria along with their stability properties. The game undergoes a…
In this paper we present a novel generic mapping between Graphical Games and Markov Random Fields so that pure Nash equilibria in the former can be found by statistical inference on the latter. Thus, the problem of deciding whether a…
We consider a class of fully stochastic and fully distributed algorithms, that we prove to learn equilibria in games. Indeed, we consider a family of stochastic distributed dynamics that we prove to converge weakly (in the sense of weak…
A discrete-time stochastic process derived from a model of basketball is used to generalize any discrete distribution. The generalized distributions can have one or two more parameters than the parent distribution. Those derived from…
In optimal stopping problems, a Markov structure guarantees Markovian optimal stopping times (first exit times). Surprisingly, there is no analogous result for Markovian stopping games once randomization is required. This paper addresses…
We define the class of "simple recursive games". A simple recursive game is defined as a simple stochastic game (a notion due to Anne Condon), except that we allow arbitrary real payoffs but disallow moves of chance. We study the complexity…
Zero-sum stochastic games generalize the notion of Markov Decision Processes (i.e. controlled Markov chains, or stochastic dynamic programming) to the 2-player competitive case : two players jointly control the evolution of a state…
We discuss various limits of a simple random exchange model that can be used for the distribution of wealth. We start from a discrete state space - discrete time version of this model and, under suitable scaling, we show its functional…
Nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with impulse controls offer a realistic and far-reaching modelling framework for applications within finance, energy markets, and other areas, but the difficulty in solving such problems has…
Transmitters of a multiple access channel are assumed to freely choose their power control strategy in order to be energy-efficient. We show that in a stochastic game framework, we can develop energy-efficient distributed control strategies…
We investigate the long-run behavior of a stochastic replicator process, which describes game dynamics for a symmetric two-player game under aggregate shocks. We establish an averaging principle that relates time averages of the process and…
This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a pair of randomised stopping times to form a saddle point of a zero-sum Dynkin game with partial and/or asymmetric information across players. The framework is non-Markovian and…
For dynamic situations where the evolution of a player's state is influenced by his own action as well as other players' states and actions, we show that equilibria derived for nonatomic games (NGs) can be used by their large finite…
In this work we consider an agent based model in order to study the wealth distribution problem where the interchange is determined with a symmetric zero sum game. Simultaneously, the agents update their way of play trying to learn the…
Simple stochastic games are turn-based 2.5-player zero-sum graph games with a reachability objective. The problem is to compute the winning probability as well as the optimal strategies of both players. In this paper, we compare the three…
This paper studies a class of stationary mean-field games of singular stochastic control with regime-switching. The representative agent adjusts the dynamics of a Markov-modulated It\^o-diffusion via a two-sided singular stochastic control…
We construct and study the transition probability matrix of evolutionary games in which the number of players is finite (and relatively small) of such games. We use a simplified version of the population games studied by Sandholm. After…
This paper considers a dynamic game with transferable utilities (TU), where the characteristic function is a continuous-time bounded mean ergodic process. A central planner interacts continuously over time with the players by choosing the…
There are multiple ways in which a stochastic system can be out of statistical equilibrium. It might be subject to time-varying forcing; or be in a transient phase on its way towards equilibrium; it might even be in equilibrium without us…
We study nonzero-sum stochastic games for continuous time Markov chains on a denumerable state space with risk sensitive discounted and ergodic cost criteria. For the discounted cost criterion we first show that the corresponding system of…