Related papers: Ownership and Trade from Evolutionary Games
How coperation between self-interested individuals evolve is a crucial problem, both in biology and in social sciences, that is far from being well understood. Evolutionary game theory is a useful approach to this issue. The simplest model…
People make strategic decisions many times a day - during negotiations, when coordinating actions with others, or when choosing partners for cooperation. The resulting dynamics can be studied with learning theory and evolutionary game…
Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…
Same-sex sexual behavior is ubiquitous in the animal kingdom, but its adaptive origins remain a prominent puzzle. Here I suggest the possibility that same-sex sexual behavior arises as a consequence of the competition between an…
We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…
We propose a model of emergence of cooperation in evolutionary games that high- lights the role of network formation and effect of network structure. In line with empirical data, the model proposes a mechanism that explains the persistence…
Across many domains of interaction, both natural and artificial, individuals use past experience to shape future behaviors. The results of such learning processes depend on what individuals wish to maximize. A natural objective is one's own…
Competing strategies in an evolutionary game model, or species in a biosystem, can easily form a larger unit which protects them from the invasion of an external actor. Such a defensive alliance may have two, three, four or even more…
We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0,1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing…
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is the defining concept of evolutionary game theory. It has a fairly unanimously accepted definition for the case of symmetric games which are played in a homogeneous population where all individuals are…
We consider zero-sum games in which players move between adjacent states, where in each pair of adjacent states one state dominates the other. The states in our game can represent positional advantages in physical conflict such as high…
Interpretation of animal behavior, especially as cooperative or selfish, is a challenge for evolutionary theory. Strategy of a competition should follow from corresponding Darwinian payoffs for the available behavioral options. The payoffs…
We show that evolution in a population of adaptive agents, repeatedly competing for a limited resource, can come to an abrupt halt. This transition from evolutionary to non-evolutionary behavior arises as the global resource level is…
In this study, we develop a novel evolutionary model that incorporates Mendelian genetics, continuous strategies, and the potential for multiple genes to contribute to a single phenotypic trait. The evolution of altruistic behavior, which…
Animals use a wide variety of strategies to reduce or avoid aggression in conflicts over resources. These strategies range from sharing resources without outward signs of conflict to the development of dominance hierarchies, in which…
A general framework of evolutionary dynamics under heterogeneous populations is presented. The framework allows continuously many types of heterogeneous agents, heterogeneity both in payoff functions and in revision protocols and the entire…
Modern ecology has re-emphasized the need for a quantitative understanding of the original 'survival of the fittest theme' based on analyzis of the intricate trade-offs between competing evolutionary strategies that characterize the…
The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away…
Spatial evolutionary games are studied with myopic players whose payoff interest, as a personal character, is tuned from selfishness to other-regarding preference via fraternity. The players are located on a square lattice and collect…
Biological and social systems are structured at multiple scales, and the incentives of individuals who interact in a group may diverge from the collective incentive of the group as a whole. Mechanisms to resolve this tension are responsible…