Related papers: Stochastic differential games with asymmetric info…
We consider two-player zero-sum differential games (ZSDGs), where the state process (dynamical system) depends on the random initial condition and the state process's distribution, and the objective functional includes the state process's…
In this paper, we consider a partial information two-person zero-sum stochastic differential game problem where the system is governed by a backward stochastic differential equation driven by Teugels martingales associated with a L\'{e}vy…
We study infinite horizon discounted-cost and ergodic-cost risk-sensitive zero-sum stochastic games for controlled continuous time Markov chains on a countable state space. For the discounted-cost game we prove the existence of value and…
In this paper, we revisit the two-player continuous-time infinite-horizon linear quadratic differential game problem, where one of the players can sample the state of the system only intermittently due to a sensing constraint while the…
We consider two-player non-zero-sum stopping games in discrete time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after both players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy according to…
We develop an option pricing model based on a tug-of-war game. This two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game is formulated in the context of a multi-dimensional financial market. The issuer and the holder try to manipulate asset…
We analyze a two-player, nonzero-sum Dynkin game of stopping with incomplete information. We assume that each player observes his own Brownian motion, which is not only independent of the other player's Brownian motion but also not…
This paper studies a stochastic game theoretic approach to security and intrusion detection in communication and computer networks. Specifically, an Attacker and a Defender take part in a two-player game over a network of nodes whose…
This paper presents a pioneering investigation into discrete-time two-person non-zero-sum linear quadratic (LQ) stochastic games with random coefficients. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of open-loop Nash…
This paper presents a learning dynamic with almost sure convergence guarantee for any stochastic game with turn-based controllers (on state transitions) as long as stage-payoffs induce a zero-sum or identical-interest game. Stage-payoffs…
This paper presents new families of algorithms for the repeated play of two-agent (near) zero-sum games and two-agent zero-sum stochastic games. For example, the family includes fictitious play and its variants as members. Commonly, the…
We describe an efficient algorithm to compute solutions for the general two-player Blotto game on n battlefields with heterogeneous values. While explicit constructions for such solutions have been limited to specific, largely symmetric or…
We consider normal-form games with $n$ players and two strategies for each player, where the payoffs are i.i.d. random variables with some distribution $F$ and we consider issues related to the pure equilibria in the game as the number of…
In this paper, we investigate informational asymmetries in the Colonel Blotto game, a game-theoretic model of competitive resource allocation between two players over a set of battlefields. The battlefield valuations are subject to…
Information asymmetry in games enables players with the information advantage to manipulate others' beliefs by strategically revealing information to other players. This work considers a double-sided information asymmetry in a Bayesian…
Stochastic dominance is a crucial tool for the analysis of choice under risk. It is typically analyzed as a property of two gambles that are taken in isolation. We study how additional independent sources of risk (e.g. uninsurable labor…
Optimization under uncertainty is a fundamental problem in learning and decision-making, particularly in multi-agent systems. Previously, Feldman, Kalai, and Tennenholtz [2010] demonstrated the ability to efficiently compete in repeated…
In this paper we investigate a game of optimal stopping with incomplete information. There are two players of which only one is informed about the precise structure of the game. Observing the informed player the uninformed player is given…
We consider a zero-sum stochastic differential game over elementary mixed feed-back strategies. These are strategies based only on the knowledge of the past state, randomized continuously in time from a sampling distribution which is kept…
When opposing parties compete for a prize, the sunk effort players exert during the conflict can affect the value of the winner's reward. These spillovers can have substantial influence on the equilibrium behavior of participants in…