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This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method presented in [4] to…

Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…

We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure…

We investigate whether having a unique equilibrium (or a given number of equilibria) is robust to perturbation of the payoffs, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We show that the set of n-player finite games with a unique…

We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytically tractable than the standard definition in terms of…

In this paper we investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games whose cost functionals are defined by a system of coupled backward stochastic differential equations. We obtain an existence…

Nash equilibrium is a solution concept in non-strictly competitive, non-cooperative game theory that finds applications in various scientific and engineering disciplines. A non-strictly competitive, non-cooperative game model is presented…

We consider the basic problem of approximating Nash equilibria in noncooperative games. For monotone games, we design continuous time flows which converge in an averaged sense to Nash equilibria. We also study mean field equilibria, which…

In the framework of continuous time symmetric stochastic differential games in open loop strategies, we introduce a generalization of mean field game solution, called coarse correlated solution. This can be seen as the analogue of a coarse…

A model of stochastic games where multiple controllers jointly control the evolution of the state of a dynamic system but have access to different information about the state and action processes is considered. The asymmetry of information…

We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…

There are only limited classes of multi-player stochastic games in which independent learning is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Markov potential games are a key example of such classes. Prior work has outlined sets of…

Correlated equilibria are sometimes more efficient than the Nash equilibria of a game without signals. We investigate whether the availability of quantum signals in the context of a classical strategic game may allow the players to achieve…

In game theory, the concept of Nash equilibrium reflects the collective stability of some individual strategies chosen by selfish agents. The concept pertains to different classes of games, e.g. the sequential games, where the agents play…

Distributed optimization and Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problems have drawn much attention in the control community recently. This paper studies a class of non-cooperative games, known as N-cluster game, which subsumes both cooperative…

This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of fiinite-player games, the limit of…

Aggregative games have many industrial applications, and computing an equilibrium in those games is challenging when the number of players is large. In the framework of atomic aggregative games with coupling constraints, we show that…

We construct Nash equilibria in feedback form for a class of two-person stochastic games of singular control with absorption, arising from a stylized model for corporate finance. More precisely, the paper focusses on a strategic dynamic…

Probabilistic model checking for stochastic games enables formal verification of systems that comprise competing or collaborating entities operating in a stochastic environment. Despite good progress in the area, existing approaches focus…