Related papers: Optimal stopping in a two-sided secretary problem
Nowadays, several crowdsourcing projects exploit social choice methods for computing an aggregate ranking of alternatives given individual rankings provided by workers. Motivated by such systems, we consider a setting where each worker is…
In the matroid secretary problem, the elements of a matroid $\mathcal{M}$ arrive in random order. Once we observe an item we need to irrevocably decide whether or not to accept it. The set of selected elements should form an independent set…
A version of the secretary problem called the duration problem, in which the objective is to maximize the time of possession of relatively best objects or the second best, is treated. It is shown that in this duration problem there are…
Most prior work on online matching problems has been with the flexibility of keeping some vertices unmatched. We study three related online matching problems with the constraint of matching every vertex, i.e., with no rejections. We adopt a…
We study a generalized binary search problem on the line and general trees. On the line (e.g., a sorted array), binary search finds a target node in $O(\log n)$ queries in the worst case, where $n$ is the number of nodes. In situations with…
We construct subgame-perfect equilibria with mixed strategies for symmetric stochastic timing games with arbitrary strategic incentives. The strategies are qualitatively different for local first- or second-mover advantages, which we…
This paper studies an online trading variant of the classical secretary problem, called secretary problem variant trading (SPVT), from the perspective of an intermediary who facilitates trade between a seller and $n$ buyers (collectively…
In search problems, a mobile searcher seeks to locate a target that hides in some unknown position of the environment. Such problems are typically considered to be of an on-line nature, in that the input is unknown to the searcher, and the…
We investigate the hiring problem where a sequence of applicants is sequentially interviewed, and a decision on whether to hire an applicant is immediately made based on the applicant's score. For the maximal and average improvement…
Following up a recent work by Ashlagi, Kanoria and Leshno, we study a stable matching problem with unequal numbers of men and women, and independent uniform preferences. The asymptotic formulas for the expected number of stable matchings,…
We develop a theory for solving continuous time optimal stopping problems for non-linear expectations. Our motivation is to consider problems in which the stopper uses risk measures to evaluate future rewards.
In classical secretary problems, a sequence of $n$ elements arrive in a uniformly random order, and we want to choose a single item, or a set of size $K$. The random order model allows us to escape from the strong lower bounds for the…
We study optimal equilibria in multi-player games. An equilibrium is optimal for a player, if her payoff is maximal. A tempting approach to solving this problem is to seek optimal Nash equilibria, the standard form of equilibria where no…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
The Matroid Secretary Problem is a central question in online optimization, modeling sequential decision-making under combinatorial constraints. We introduce a bipartite graph framework that unifies and extends several known formulations,…
Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…
We study the prophet secretary problem, a well-studied variant of the classic prophet inequality, where values are drawn from independent known distributions but arrive in uniformly random order. Upon seeing a value at each step, the…
In the symmetric rendezvous problem two players follow the same (randomized) strategy to visit one of $n$ locations in each time step $t=0,1,2,\dots$. Their goal is to minimize the expected time until they visit the same location and thus…
This paper studies Makespan Minimization in the secretary model. Formally, jobs, specified by their processing times, are presented in a uniformly random order. An online algorithm has to assign each job permanently and irrevocably to one…
One of the classic problems in online decision-making is the *secretary problem* where to goal is to maximize the probability of choosing the largest number from a randomly ordered sequence. A natural extension allows selecting multiple…