Related papers: Two-player nonZero-sum stopping games in discrete …

The infinite horizon risk-sensitive discounted-cost and ergodic-cost nonzero-sum stochastic games for controlled Markov chains with countably many states are analyzed. For the discounted-cost game, we prove the existence of Nash equilibrium…

Establishing the existence of exact or near Markov or stationary perfect Nash equilibria in nonzero-sum Markov games over Borel spaces is a challenging problem with limited positive results. Motivated by problems in multi-agent and Bayesian…

The paper solves constrained Dynkin games with risk-sensitive criteria, where two players are allowed to stop at two independent Poisson random intervention times, via the theory of backward stochastic differential equations. This…

In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…

We consider infinite-state turn-based stochastic games of two players, Box and Diamond, who aim at maximizing and minimizing the expected total reward accumulated along a run, respectively. Since the total accumulated reward is unbounded,…

This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect information. We present an example to show that a player may obtain higher payoff by playing mixed strategy. By contrast, the main result of the paper shows that every…

We show, under weaker assumptions than in the previous literature, that a perpetual optimal stopping game always has a value. We also show that there exists an optimal stopping time for the seller, but not necessarily for the buyer.…

We study zero-sum repeated games where the minimizing player has to pay a certain cost each time he changes his action. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that the value of the game exists in stationary strategies, depending solely…

We consider N-player and mean field games in continuous time over a finite horizon, where the position of each agent belongs to {-1,1}. If there is uniqueness of mean field game solutions, e.g. under monotonicity assumptions, then the…

We study the existence of different notions of value in two-person zero-sum repeated games where the state evolves and players receive signals. We provide some examples showing that the limsup value (and the uniform value) may not exist in…

We study infinite horizon discounted-cost and ergodic-cost risk-sensitive zero-sum stochastic games for controlled continuous time Markov chains on a countable state space. For the discounted-cost game we prove the existence of value and…

We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…

In this paper, we obtain a stochastic approximation that converges to the viscosity solution of the weighted $p$-Laplace equation. We consider a stochastic two-player zero-sum game controlled by a random walk, two player's choices, and the…

It is well known that the (unique) value of a stochastic control problem or a two person zero sum game under Isaacs condition can be characterized through a PDE driven by the Hamiltonian. Our goal of this paper is to extend this classical…

We provide a direct, elementary proof for the existence of $\lim_{\lambda\to 0} v_{\lambda}$, where $v_{\lambda}$ is the value of a $\lambda$-discounted finite two-person zero-sum stochastic game.

We study discrete two player all-pay auction with complete information. We provide full characterization of mixed strategy Nash equilibria and show that they constitute a subset of Nash equilibria of discrete General Lotto game. We show…

We present a fast numerical algorithm for large scale zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information, which combines policy iteration and algebraic multigrid methods. This algorithm can be applied either to a true finite state space…

We obtain global, non-asymptotic convergence guarantees for independent learning algorithms in competitive reinforcement learning settings with two agents (i.e., zero-sum stochastic games). We consider an episodic setting where in each…

In this paper we study how to play (stochastic) games optimally using little space. We focus on repeated games with absorbing states, a type of two-player, zero-sum concurrent mean-payoff games. The prototypical example of these games is…

We consider the question of whether, and in what sense, Wardrop equilibria provide a good approximation for Nash equilibria in atomic unsplittable congestion games with a large number of small players. We examine two different definitions…