Related papers: What majority decisions are possible
We consider the challenge of preference elicitation in systems that help users discover the most desirable item(s) within a given database. Past work on preference elicitation focused on structured models that provide a factored…
We give an account on what is known on the subject of permutation matchings, which are bijections of a finite regular semigroup that map each element to one of its inverses. This includes partial solutions to some open questions, including…
We study multiwinner elections with approval-based preferences. An instance of a multiwinner election consists of a set of alternatives, a population of voters---each voter approves a subset of alternatives, and the desired committee size…
Given a set of agents with approval preferences over each other, we study the task of finding $k$ matchings fairly representing everyone's preferences. We model the problem as an approval-based multiwinner election where the set of…
In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters express approval preferences over a set of candidates, and the goal is to return a winning committee. This model captures a broad range of subset selection problems under preferences. Prior work…
Condorcet's paradox is a fundamental result in social choice theory which states that there exist elections in which, no matter which candidate wins, a majority of voters prefer a different candidate. In fact, even if we can select any $k$…
An important problem in computational social choice theory is the complexity of undesirable behavior among agents, such as control, manipulation, and bribery in election systems. These kinds of voting strategies are often tempting at the…
We consider an agent community wishing to decide on several binary issues by means of issue-by-issue majority voting. For each issue and each agent, one of the two options is better than the other. However, some of the agents may be…
The Frankl's conjecture, formulated in 1979. and still open, states that in every family of sets closed for unions there is an element contained in at least half of the sets. A family Fc is called Frankl-complete (or FC-family) if in every…
Decision procedures aggregating the preferences of multiple agents can produce cycles and hence outcomes which have been described heuristically as `chaotic'. We make this description precise by constructing an explicit dynamical system…
We consider families F of sequences converging to +infinity that F satisfies the following condition (C): (C): if an open set U in the real line is unbounded above then there exists a sequence belonging to F, which has an infinite number of…
In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences…
A novel approach for solving a multiple judge, multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) problem is proposed. The ranking of alternatives that are evaluated based on multiple criteria is difficult, since the presence of multiple criteria…
Recent work on the representation of functions on sets has considered the use of summation in a latent space to enforce permutation invariance. In particular, it has been conjectured that the dimension of this latent space may remain fixed…
This paper investigates certain classes of entire functions in C^n that, together with their partial derivatives, share a finite set consisting of three elements. By employing normality criteria, we study the behaviour of such functions and…
In this paper we address the decision problem for a fragment of set theory with restricted quantification which extends the language studied in [4] with pair related quantifiers and constructs, in view of possible applications in the field…
Referring to a standard context of voting theory, and to the classic notion of voting situation, here we show that it is possible to observe any arbitrary set of elections' outcomes, no matter how paradoxical it may appear. On this purpose…
We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions, i.e., we offer a complete answer regarding what social choice functions can be rationalizably implemented.
A common assumption in modern microeconomic theory is that choice should be rationalizable via a binary preference relation, which \citeauthor{Sen71a} showed to be equivalent to two consistency conditions, namely $\alpha$ (contraction) and…
I formulate and characterize the following two-stage choice behavior. The decision maker is endowed with two preferences. She shortlists all maximal alternatives according to the first preference. If the first preference is decisive, in the…