Related papers: What majority decisions are possible
We study how linear orders can be employed to realise choice functions for which the set of potential choices is restricted, i.e., the possible choice is not possible among the full powerset of all alternatives. In such restricted settings,…
We present an alternative voting system that aims at bridging the gap between proportional representative systems and majoritarian, single winner election systems. The system lets people vote for multiple parties, but then assigns each…
In the theory of voting, the Plurality rule for preferences that come in the form of linear orders selects the alternatives most frequently appearing in the first position of those orders, while the Anti-Plurality rule selects the…
We prove that the following problem is decidable: given a finite set of relations, decide whether this set admits a near-unanimity function.
A family of sets F is said to be union-closed if A \cup B is in F for every A and B in F. Frankl's conjecture states that given any finite union-closed family of sets, not all empty, there exists an element contained in at least half of the…
We consider multi-agent systems where agents' preferences are aggregated via sequential majority voting: each decision is taken by performing a sequence of pairwise comparisons where each comparison is a weighted majority vote among the…
Coalitional manipulation in voting is considered to be any scenario in which a group of voters decide to misrepresent their vote in order to secure an outcome they all prefer to the first outcome of the election when they vote honestly. The…
Given the family $P$ of all nonempty subsets of a set $U$ of alternatives, a choice over $U$ is a function $c \colon \Omega \to P$ such that $\Omega \subseteq P$ and $c(B) \subseteq B$ for all menus $B \in \Omega$. A choice is total if…
We analyze properties of apportionment functions in context of the problem of allocating seats in the European Parliament. Necessary and sufficient conditions for apportionment functions are investigated. Some exemplary families of…
We present a new model that describes the process of electing a group of representatives (e.g., a parliament) for a group of voters. In this model, called the voting committee model, the elected group of representatives runs a number of…
A continuous selection of polynomial functions is a continuous function whose domain can be partitioned into finitely many pieces on which the function coincides with a polynomial. Given a set of finitely many polynomials, we show that…
Condorcet domains are subsets of permutations arising in voting theory: regarding their permutations as preference orders on a list of candidates, one avoids Condorcet's paradox when aggregating the preferences via a simple majority…
We consider a model where a subset of candidates must be selected based on voter preferences, subject to general constraints that specify which subsets are feasible. This model generalizes committee elections with diversity constraints,…
Actual individual preferences are neither complete (=total) nor antisymmetric in general, so that at least every quasi-order must be an admissible input to a satisfactory choice rule. It is argued that the traditional notion of…
We mainly investigate model of set theory with restricted choice, e.g., ZF + DC + "the family of countable subsets of lambda is well ordered for every lambda" (really local version for a given lambda). In this frame much of pcf theory can…
The Union Closed Sets Conjecture states that in every finite, nontrivial set family closed under taking unions there is an element contained in at least half of all the sets of the family. We investigate two new directions with respect to…
Given a bivariate system of polynomial equations with fixed support sets $A, B$ it is natural to ask which multiplicities its solutions can have. We prove that there exists a system with a solution of multiplicity $i$ for all $i$ in the…
We consider the notions of agreement, diversity, and polarization in ordinal elections (that is, in elections where voters rank the candidates). While (computational) social choice offers good measures of agreement between the voters, such…
Pairwise comparisons between alternatives are a well-established tool to decompose decision problems into smaller and more easily tractable sub-problems. However, due to our limited rationality, the subjective preferences expressed by…
In economic theory, an agent chooses from available alternatives -- modeled as a set. In decisions in the field or in the lab, however, agents do not have access to the set of alternatives at once. Instead, alternatives are represented by…