Related papers: Observations concerning G\"odel's 1931
Standard expositions of Goedel's 1931 paper on undecidable arithmetical propositions are based on two presumptions in Goedel's 1931 interpretation of his own, formal, reasoning - one each in Theorem VI and in Theorem XI - which do not meet…
Goedel's results have had a great impact in diverse fields such as philosophy, computer sciences and fundamentals of mathematics. The fact that the rule of mathematical induction is contradictory with the rest of clauses used by Goedel to…
In an earlier paper, "Omega-inconsistency in Goedel's formal system: a constructive proof of the Entscheidungsproblem" (math/0206302), I argued that a constructive interpretation of Goedel's reasoning establishes any formal system of…
In this article we discuss the proof in the short unpublished paper appeared in the 3rd volume of Godel's Collected Works entitled "On undecidable sentences" (*1931?), which provides an introduction to Godel's 1931 ideas regarding the…
We take an argument of G\"odel's from his ground-breaking 1931 paper, generalize it, and examine its validity. The argument in question is this: the sentence $G$ says about itself that it is not provable, and $G$ is indeed not provable;…
It is generally accepted that the incompleteness of first-order number theory (PA) is established by an application of Godel's proof. This paper shows that the arithmetization of the syntax of PA implies that the hypothesised class of PA…
Standard interpretations of Goedel's "undecidable" proposition, [(Ax)R(x)], argue that, although [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable if [(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable, we may not conclude from this that [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable. We show that such…
We demonstrate that, in itself and in the absence of extra premises, the following argument scheme is fallacious: The sentence A says about itself that it has a certain property F, and A does in fact have the property F; therefore A is…
Godelian sentences of a sufficiently strong and recursively enumerable theory, constructed in Godel's 1931 groundbreaking paper on the incompleteness theorems, are unprovable if the theory is consistent; however, they could be refutable.…
We conclude from Goedel's Theorem VII of his seminal 1931 paper that every recursive function f(x_{1}, x_{2}) is representable in the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA by a formula [F(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3})] which is algorithmically verifiable,…
We argue that Godel's completeness theorem is equivalent to completability of consistent theories, and Godel's incompleteness theorem is equivalent to the fact that this completion is not constructive, in the sense that there are some…
I review the classical conclusions drawn from Goedel's meta-reasoning establishing an undecidable proposition GUS in standard PA. I argue that, for any given set of numerical values of its free variables, every recursive arithmetical…
If we apply an extension of the Deduction meta-Theorem to Goedel's meta-reasoning of "undecidability", we can conclude that Goedel's formal system of Arithmetic is not omega-consistent. If we then take the standard interpretation…
In this note we observe that automated theorem provers (ATPs) that recursively enumerate theorems in a particular way will fail to identify some valid theorems for a reason that is analogous to how G\"odel proved the existence of what are…
In our previous version entitled ``The reducing sphere complexes for the 3-sphere are connected: a proof of the Powell Conjecture", we claimed to prove the Powell Conjecture, which states that the Goeritz group of the genus-$g$ Heegaard…
Godel numbering is an arithmetization of sintax which defines provability by coding a primitive recursive predicate, Pf(x,v). A multiplicity of researches and results all around this well-known recursive predicate are today widespread in…
We consider the thesis that an arithmetical relation, which holds for any, given, assignment of natural numbers to its free variables, is Turing-decidable if, and only if, it is the standard representation of a PA-provable formula. We show…
Paper withdrawn. There is a gap in the proof of Proposition 4.3 (its conclusion ``d'o\`{u} la proposition.'' is incorrect). Therefore theorems 1.1 and 3.1, which were the main results of the paper, are not proved.
A detailed and rigorous analysis of G\"odel's proof of his first incompleteness theorem is presented. The purpose of this analysis is two-fold. The first is to reveal what G\"odel actually proved to provide a clear and solid foundation upon…
This paper gives a counterexample to the impossibility, by G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem, of proving a formula expressing the consistency of arithmetic in a fragment of arithmetic on the assumption that the latter is consistent.…