Related papers: Social Choice Under Incomplete, Cyclic Preferences
It is well-known that Choice and Regularity are independent of each other but have important common consequences of logical character (reflection principles, representations of classes by sets, etc.). We explain this phenomenon by isolating…
In this paper we extend the principle of proportional representation to rankings. We consider the setting where alternatives need to be ranked based on approval preferences. In this setting, proportional representation requires that…
We study situations where a group of voters need to take a collective decision over a number of public issues, with the goal of getting a result that reflects the voters' opinions in a proportional manner. Our focus is on interconnected…
Incomputability results in Formal Logic and the Theory of Computation (i.e., incompleteness and undecidability) have deep implications for the foundations of mathematics and computer science. Likewise, Social Choice Theory, a branch of…
We introduce three different qualifications of the reversal bias in the framework of social choice correspondences. For each of them, we prove that the Minimax social choice correspondence is immune to it if and only if the number of voters…
We give a structure theorem for all coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is a subset of cardinality two of a given larger set of alternatives. We provide this in the case where the voters/agents are allowed to…
Individual choices often depend on the order in which the decisions are made. In this paper, we expose a general theory of measurable systems (an example of which is an individual's preferences) allowing for incompatible (non-commuting)…
This paper introduces the axiom of Negative Dominance, stating that if a lottery $f$ is strictly preferred to a lottery $g$, then some outcome in the support of $f$ is strictly preferred to some outcome in the support of $g$. It is shown…
We study the problem of fair sequential decision making given voter preferences. In each round, a decision rule must choose a decision from a set of alternatives where each voter reports which of these alternatives they approve. Instead of…
We view sorites in terms of stimuli acting upon a system and evoking this system's responses. Supervenience of responses on stimuli implies that they either lack tolerance (i.e., they change in every vicinity of some of the stimuli), or…
In selection processes such as hiring, promotion, and college admissions, implicit bias toward socially-salient attributes such as race, gender, or sexual orientation of candidates is known to produce persistent inequality and reduce…
We study settings in which agents with incomplete preferences need to make a collective decision. We focus on a process of majority dynamics where issues are addressed one at a time and undecided agents follow the opinion of the majority.…
We consider the problem of extending an acyclic binary relation that is invariant under a given family of transformations into an invariant preference. We show that when a family of transformations is commutative, every acyclic invariant…
Social choice functions (SCFs) map the preferences of a group of agents over some set of alternatives to a non-empty subset of alternatives. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has shown that only extremely restrictive SCFs are strategyproof…
A primary challenge in collective decision-making is that achieving unanimous agreement is difficult, even at the level of criteria. The history of social choice theory illustrates this: numerous normative criteria on voting rules have been…
We designed and ran an experiment to test how often people's choices are reversed by others' recommendations when facing different levels of confirmation and conformity pressures. In our experiment participants were first asked to provide…
We consider synchronous iterative voting, where voters are given the opportunity to strategically choose their ballots depending on the outcome deduced from the previous collective choices.We propose two settings for synchronous iterative…
A social decision rule (SDR) is any non-empty set-valued map that associates any profile of individual preferences with the set of (winning) alternatives. An SDR is Condorcet-consistent if it selects the set of Condorcet winners whenever…
The broad concept of an individual's welfare is actually a cluster of related specific concepts that bear a "family resemblance" to one another. One might care about how a policy will affect people both in terms of their subjective…
This paper is dedicated to a cautious learning methodology for predicting preferences between alternatives characterized by binary attributes (formally, each alternative is seen as a subset of attributes). By "cautious", we mean that the…