Related papers: On the Arrow property
We consider social welfare functions when the preferences of individual agents and society maximize subjective expected utility in the tradition of Savage. A system of axioms is introduced whose unique solution is the social welfare…
Even though classic theories and models of discrete choice pose man as a rational being, it has been shown extensively that people persistently violate rationality in their actual choices. Recent models of decision-making take these…
Choice functions over a set $X$ that satisfy the Outcast, a.k.a. Aizerman, property are exactly those that attach to any set its maximal subset relative to some total order of ${2}^{X}$.
Coalition Logic is an important logic in logical studies of strategic reasoning, whose models are concurrent game models. In this paper, first, we systematically discuss three assumptions of concurrent game models and argue that they are…
Social choice theory is the study of preference aggregation across a population, used both in mechanism design for human agents and in the democratic alignment of language models. In this study, we propose the representative social choice…
I formulate and characterize the following two-stage choice behavior. The decision maker is endowed with two preferences. She shortlists all maximal alternatives according to the first preference. If the first preference is decisive, in the…
There are p heterogeneous objects to be assigned to n competing agents (n > p) each with unit demand. It is required to design a Groves mechanism for this assignment problem satisfying weak budget balance, individual rationality, and…
Adopting the approach of [7] we study rational function carrying invariant line fields on the Julia set. In particular, we show that under certain weak conditions all possible measurable invariant line fields of a rational function on its…
We prove that the first-order theory of any function field K of characteristic p>2 is undecidable in the language of rings without parameters. When K is a function field in one variable whose constant field is algebraic over a finite field,…
The Nash equilibrium paradigm, and Rational Choice Theory in general, rely on agents acting independently from each other. This note shows how this assumption is crucial in the definition of Rational Choice Theory. It explains how a…
A group of individuals wishes to classify $m$ objects into $n$ categories in such a way that no class is left empty, a condition known as surjectivity. The opinions of the individuals are aggregated separately for each object using an…
Coalition Logic studies what coalitions can enforce. Recent work treats inability as simple non-ability: $\neg\Eff{C}\varphi$. This conflates two distinct configurations -- a coalition unable to force $\varphi$ may still force…
We study a simple example of a sequential game illustrating problems connected with making rational decisions that are universal for social sciences. The set of chooser's optimal decisions that manifest his preferences in case of a constant…
We propose an AC-independent proof of the existence of a non-measurable set as a consequence of the Hahn-Banach theorem of functional analysis which is known to be strictly weaker than AC.
We study three axioms in the model of constrained social choice under uncertainty where (i) agents have subjective expected utility preferences over acts and (ii) different states of nature have (possibly) different sets of available…
Rational decision making in its linguistic description means making logical decisions. In essence, a rational agent optimally processes all relevant information to achieve its goal. Rationality has two elements and these are the use of…
Suppose we are given a family of choice functions on pairs from a given finite set. The set is considered as a set of alternatives (say candidates for an office) and the functions as potential "voters". The question is, what choice…
Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown that the only single-valued social choice functions (SCFs) that satisfy non-imposition (i.e., the function's range coincides with its codomain) and strategyproofness (i.e., voters are never better off by…
Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) attempts to infer human rewards or preferences from observed behavior. Since human planning systematically deviates from rationality, several approaches have been tried to account for specific human…
If uncertainty is modelled by a probability measure, decisions are typically made by choosing the option with the highest expected utility. If an imprecise probability model is used instead, this decision rule can be generalised in several…