Related papers: Antinomies of Mathematical Reason: The Inconsisten…
In an earlier paper, "Omega-inconsistency in Goedel's formal system: a constructive proof of the Entscheidungsproblem" (math/0206302), I argued that a constructive interpretation of Goedel's reasoning establishes any formal system of…
A new computational method that uses polynomial equations and dynamical systems to evaluate logical propositions is introduced and applied to Goedel's incompleteness theorems. The truth value of a logical formula subject to a set of axioms…
This paper exposes a contradiction in the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC). While Godel's incompleteness theorems state that a consistent system cannot prove its consistency, they do not eliminate proofs using a…
In this paper, we argue that formal systems of first order Arithmetic that admit Goedelian undecidable propositions validly are abnormally non-constructive. We argue that, in such systems, the strong representation of primitive recursive…
In this paper we propose an interpretation for self-referential propositions in a "meta-model" N* of ZF. This meta-model N* is considered as an informal model of arithmetic that mathematicians often use when working with number theory.…
If we apply an extension of the Deduction meta-Theorem to Goedel's meta-reasoning of "undecidability", we can conclude that Goedel's formal system of Arithmetic is not omega-consistent. If we then take the standard interpretation…
We first partly develop a mathematical notion of stable consistency intended to reflect the actual consistency property of human beings. Then we give a generalization of the first and second G\"odel incompleteness theorem to stably…
Standard expositions of Goedel's 1931 paper on undecidable arithmetical propositions are based on two presumptions in Goedel's 1931 interpretation of his own, formal, reasoning - one each in Theorem VI and in Theorem XI - which do not meet…
We offer a mathematical proof of consistency for Peano Arithmetic PA formalizable in PA. This result is compatible with Goedel's Second Incompleteness Theorem since our consistency proof does not rely on the representation of consistency as…
In this note we observe that automated theorem provers (ATPs) that recursively enumerate theorems in a particular way will fail to identify some valid theorems for a reason that is analogous to how G\"odel proved the existence of what are…
Classical theory proves that every primitive recursive function is strongly representable in PA; that formal Peano Arithmetic, PA, and formal primitive recursive arithmetic, PRA, can both be interpreted in Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory, ZF;…
In much discussed work Artemov has recently shown that, for $\mathrm{PA}$, the consistency schema admits a form of uniform verification via selector proofs, despite the unprovability of the corresponding uniform consistency sentence…
G\"odel's argument for the First Incompleteness Theorem is, structurally, a proof by contradiction. This article intends to reframe the argument by, first, isolating an additional assumption the argument relies on, and then, second, arguing…
Although the categorical arithmetic is not effectively axiomatizable, the belief that the incompleteness Theorems can be apply to it is fairly common. Furthermore, the so-called "essential" (or "inherent") semantic incompleteness of the…
The prevalent interpretation of G\"odel's Second Theorem states that a sufficiently adequate and consistent theory does not prove its consistency. It is however not entirely clear how to justify this informal reading, as the formulation of…
I present the proof of Goedel's First Incompleteness theorem in an intuitive manner, while covering all technically challenging steps. I present generalizations of Goedel's fixed point lemma to two-sentence and multi-sentence versions,…
This paper gives a counterexample to the impossibility, by G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem, of proving a formula expressing the consistency of arithmetic in a fragment of arithmetic on the assumption that the latter is consistent.…
G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem is standardly understood as showing that no sufficiently strong, consistent theory of arithmetic can prove its own consistency, a result typically interpreted against a model-theoretic background in…
A constructive proof of the Goedel-Rosser incompleteness theorem has been completed using the Coq proof assistant. Some theory of classical first-order logic over an arbitrary language is formalized. A development of primitive recursive…
A semantic analysis of formal systems is undertaken, wherein the duality of their symbolic definition based on the "State of Doing" and "State of Being" is brought out. We demonstrate that when these states are defined in a way that opposes…