Related papers: How to Guarantee Secrecy for Cryptographic Protoco…

Several of the basic cryptographic constructs have associated algebraic structures. Formal models proposed by Dolev and Yao to study the (unconditional) security of public key protocols form a group. The security of some types of protocols…

This document presents the security protocol verifier CryptoVerif.CryptoVerif does not rely on the symbolic, Dolev-Yao model, but on the computational model. It can verify secrecy, correspondence (which include authentication), and…

Logics for security protocol analysis require the formalization of an adversary model that specifies the capabilities of adversaries. A common model is the Dolev-Yao model, which considers only adversaries that can compose and replay…

Methods of quantum mechanics promise information-theoretic security for various protocols in cryptography. However, impossibility of some cryptographic applications such as standard bit commitment, oblivious transfer, multiparty secure…

Quantum cryptography uses techniques and ideas from physics and computer science. The combination of these ideas makes the security proofs of quantum cryptography a complicated task. To prove that a quantum-cryptography protocol is secure,…

A choreography describes a transaction in which several principals interact. Since choreographies frequently describe business processes affecting substantial assets, we need a security infrastructure in order to implement them safely. As…

As mobile devices pervade physical space, the familiar authentication patterns are becoming insufficient: besides entity authentication, many applications require, e.g., location authentication. Many interesting protocols have been proposed…

Memory erasure protocols serve to clean up a device's memory before the installation of new software. Although this task can be accomplished by direct hardware manipulation, remote software-based memory erasure protocols have emerged as a…

The implementation of security protocols often combines different languages. This practice, however, poses a challenge to traditional verification techniques, which typically assume a single-language environment and, therefore, are…

Security protocols enable secure communication over insecure channels. Privacy protocols enable private interactions over secure channels. Security protocols set up secure channels using cryptographic primitives. Privacy protocols set up…

Two styles of definitions are usually considered to express that a security protocol preserves the confidentiality of a data s. Reachability-based secrecy means that s should never be disclosed while equivalence-based secrecy states that…

Cryptographic Protocols (CP) are distributed algorithms intended for secure communication in an insecure environment. They are used, for example, in electronic payments, electronic voting procedures, systems of confidential data processing,…

A fundamental question that has been studied in cryptography and in information theory is whether two parties can communicate confidentially using exclusively an open channel. We consider the model in which the two parties hold inputs that…

Many decision problems on security protocols can be reduced to solving so-called intruder constraints in Dolev Yao model. Most constraint solving procedures for protocol security rely on two properties of constraint systems called…

Standard quantum cryptographic protocols are not secure if one assumes that nonlocal hidden variables exist and can be measured with arbitrary precision. The security can be restored if one of the communicating parties randomly switches…

In this paper, we present a new formal method to analyze cryptographic protocols statically for the property of secrecy. It consists in inspecting the level of security of every component in the protocol and making sure that it does not…

A cryptographic protocol (CP) is a distributed algorithm designed to provide a secure communication in an insecure environment. CPs are used, for example, in electronic payments, electronic voting procedures, database access systems, etc.…

Informal arguments that cryptographic protocols are secure can be made rigorous using inductive definitions. The approach is based on ordinary predicate calculus and copes with infinite-state systems. Proofs are generated using…

We develop a general framework for parameter estimation that allows only trusted parties to access the result and achieves optimal precision. The protocols are designed such that adversaries can access some information indeterministically,…

In several critical military missions, more than one decision level are involved. These decision levels are often independent and distributed, and sensitive pieces of information making up the military mission must be kept hidden from one…