Related papers: A modular eballot system - V0.6

Estonian Internet voting has been used in national-wide elections since 2005. However, the system was initially designed in a heuristic manner, with very few proven security guarantees. The Estonian Internet voting system has constantly…

We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority from dominating minorities: whether a voting rule makes a majority powerful, and whether minorities can veto the candidates they do not prefer. For a given voting…

Voting is a means to agree on a collective decision based on available choices (e.g., candidates), where participants agree to abide by their outcome. To improve some features of e-voting, decentralized blockchain-based solutions can be…

Bribery in election (or computational social choice in general) is an important problem that has received a considerable amount of attention. In the classic bribery problem, the briber (or attacker) bribes some voters in attempting to make…

This paper explores the utilization of blockchain token voting technology in student course selection systems. The current course selection systems face various issues, which can be mitigated through the implementation of blockchain…

The election, a cornerstone of democracy, is one of the best-recognizable symbols of democratic governance. Voters' confidence in elections is essential, and these days, we can watch practically in live broadcast what consequences distrust…

This paper presents Solidago, an end-to-end modular pipeline to allow any community of users to collaboratively score any number of entities. Solidago proposes a six-module decomposition. First, it uses pretrust and peer-to-peer vouches to…

Although they differ in the functionality they offer, low-level systems exhibit certain patterns of design and utilization of computing resources. In this paper, we argue the position that modalities, in the sense of modal logic, should be…

As computer vision is prevalently used for mail-in ballot processing and counting, it becomes a point of centralized trust in postal voting. We propose DVote, a prototype system of postal voting that provides decentralized trust in computer…

Transparency and security are essential in our voting system, and voting machines. This paper describes an implementation of a stateless, transparent voting machine (STVM). The STVM is a ballot marking device (BMD) that uses a transparent,…

Coercion resistance is an important and one of the most intricate security requirements of electronic voting protocols. Several definitions of coercion resistance have been proposed in the literature, including definitions based on symbolic…

Much of the theoretical work on strategic voting makes strong assumptions about what voters know about the voting situation. A strategizing voter is typically assumed to know how other voters will vote and to know the rules of the voting…

Platforms for online civic participation rely heavily on methods for condensing thousands of comments into a relevant handful, based on whether participants agree or disagree with them. These methods should guarantee fair representation of…

To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated according to a voting protocol. However, in realistic settings,…

This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In…

The outcome of an election depends not only on which candidate is more popular, but also on how many of their voters actually turn out to vote. Here we consider a simple model in which voters abstain from voting if they think their vote…

Multiwinner voting rules can be used to select a fixed-size committee from a larger set of candidates. We consider approval-based committee rules, which allow voters to approve or disapprove candidates. In this setting, several voting rules…

We extend Approval voting to the settings where voters may have intransitive preferences. The major obstacle to applying Approval voting in these settings is that voters are not able to clearly determine who they should approve or…

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that no unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule is strategyproof. We revisit voting rules and consider a weaker notion of strategyproofness called not obvious manipulability that was proposed by…

In this paper, we present a private voting system that consists of N authorized voters who may vote to one of the K candidates or vote abstain. Each voter wants to compute the final tally while staying private and robust against malicious…