Related papers: Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resi…
We study the complexity of constructive bribery in the context of structured multiwinner approval elections. Given such an election, we ask whether a certain candidate can join the winning committee by adding, deleting, or swapping…
Successive elimination of candidates is often a route to making manipulation intractable to compute. We prove that eliminating candidates does not necessarily increase the computational complexity of manipulation. However, for many voting…
Mechanism design is concerned with settings where a policymaker (or social planner) faces the problem of aggregating the announced preferences of multiple agents into a collective (or social), system-wide decision. One of the most important…
Electing leader is a vital issue not only in distributed computing but also in communication network [1, 2, 3, 4, 5], centralized mutual exclusion algorithm [6, 7], centralized control IPC, etc. A leader is required to make synchronization…
We focus on a generalization of the classic Minisum approval voting rule, introduced by Barrot and Lang (2016), and referred to as Conditional Minisum (CMS), for multi-issue elections with preferential dependencies. Under this rule, voters…
Coalitional manipulation in voting is considered to be any scenario in which a group of voters decide to misrepresent their vote in order to secure an outcome they all prefer to the first outcome of the election when they vote honestly. The…
In parliamentary elections, parties compete for a limited, typically fixed number of seats. Most parliaments are assembled using apportionment methods that distribute the seats based on the parties' vote counts. Common apportionment methods…
Complex systems are ubiquitous in the real world and tend to have complicated and poorly understood dynamics. For their control issues, the challenge is to guarantee accuracy, robustness, and generalization in such bloated and troubled…
Today, Internet involves many actors who are making revenues on it (operators, companies, service providers,...). It is therefore important to be able to make fair decisions in this large-scale and highly competitive economical ecosystem.…
Voting is a simple mechanism to aggregate the preferences of agents. Many voting rules have been shown to be NP-hard to manipulate. However, a number of recent theoretical results suggest that this complexity may only be in the worst-case…
We introduce the notion of {\em Distance Restricted Manipulation}, where colluding manipulator(s) need to compute if there exist votes which make their preferred alternative win the election when their knowledge about the others' votes is a…
The Coalitional Manipulation problem has been studied extensively in the literature for many voting rules. However, most studies have focused on the complete information setting, wherein the manipulators know the votes of the…
Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes-no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of ``yea''…
Transitive proxy voting (or "liquid democracy") is a novel form of collective decision making, often framed as an attractive hybrid of direct and representative democracy. Although the ideas behind liquid democracy have garnered widespread…
We study the voting problem with two alternatives where voters' preferences depend on a not-directly-observable state variable. While equilibria in the one-round voting mechanisms lead to a good decision, they are usually hard to compute…
Fairness in multiwinner elections, a growing line of research in computational social choice, primarily concerns the use of constraints to ensure fairness. Recent work proposed a model to find a diverse \emph{and} representative committee…
Hybrid systems are characterized by having an interaction between continuous dynamics and discrete events. The contribution of this paper is to provide hybrid systems with a novel geometric formulation so that controls can be added. Using…
In the face of adverse motives, it is indispensable to achieve a consensus. Elections have been the canonical way by which modern democracy has operated since the 17th century. Nowadays, they regulate markets, provide an engine for modern…
We study control problems in the context of matching under preferences: We examine how a central authority, called the controller, can manipulate an instance of the Stable Marriage or Stable Roommates problems in order to achieve certain…
Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mathematical model: Elections as problem of choice or ranking. We show how the model can be enhanced to take into account the complete process…