Related papers: The Many Faces of Rationalizability

Given a dynamic ordinal game, we deem a strategy sequentially rational if there exist a Bernoulli utility function and a conditional probability system with respect to which the strategy is a maximizer. We establish a complete class theorem…

This paper addresses complexity problems in rational verification and synthesis for multi-player games played on weighted graphs, where the objective of each player is to minimize the cost of reaching a specific set of target vertices. In…

The dominant theories of rational choice assume logical omniscience. That is, they assume that when facing a decision problem, an agent can perform all relevant computations and determine the truth value of all relevant logical/mathematical…

The notion of individual fairness is a formalization of an ethical principle, "Treating like cases alike," which has been argued such as by Aristotle. In a fairness-aware machine learning context, Dwork et al. firstly formalized the notion.…

Indifference of a player with respect to two distinct outcomes of a game cannot be handled by small perturbations, because the actual choice may have significant impact on other players, and cause them to act in a way that has significant…

We present infinite extensive strategy profiles with perfect information and we show that replacing finite by infinite changes the notions and the reasoning tools. The presentation uses a formalism recently developed by logicians and…

We define notions of cautiousness and cautious belief to provide epistemic conditions for iterated admissibility in finite games. We show that iterated admissibility characterizes the behavioral implications of "cautious rationality and…

We provide an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on possibility correspondences. We first establish a generic result that links true common beliefs (and, respectively, common knowledge) of players' rationality defined by…

Learning models do not in general imply that weakly dominated strategies are irrelevant or justify the related concept of "forward induction," because rational agents may use dominated strategies as experiments to learn how opponents play,…

Graph games of infinite length are a natural model for open reactive processes: one player represents the controller, trying to ensure a given specification, and the other represents a hostile environment. The evolution of the system…

This paper examines games with strategic complements or substitutes and incomplete information, where players are uncertain about the opponents' parameters. We assume that the players' beliefs about the opponent's parameters are selected…

We study learning in complete-information games, allowing the players' models of their environment to be misspecified. We introduce Berk--Nash rationalizability: the largest self-justified set of actions -- meaning each action in the set is…

Explainable artificial intelligence and interpretable machine learning are research domains growing in importance. Yet, the underlying concepts remain somewhat elusive and lack generally agreed definitions. While recent inspiration from…

A plausible definition of "reasoning" could be "algebraically manipulating previously acquired knowledge in order to answer a new question". This definition covers first-order logical inference or probabilistic inference. It also includes…

We consider a computing system where a master processor assigns tasks for execution to worker processors through the Internet. We model the workers decision of whether to comply (compute the task) or not (return a bogus result to save the…

An analysis of several important aspects of competition or conflict in games, social choice and decision theory is presented. Inherent difficulties and complexities in cooperation are highlighted. These have over the years led to a certain…

Coalition Logic is an important logic in logical studies of strategic reasoning, whose models are concurrent game models. In this paper, first, we systematically discuss three assumptions of concurrent game models and argue that they are…

We introduce a novel choice dataset, called joint choice, in which options and menus are multidimensional. In this general setting, we define a notion of choice separability, which requires that selections from some dimensions are never…

In an earlier experiment, participants played a perfect information game against a computer, which was programmed to deviate often from its backward induction strategy right at the beginning of the game. Participants knew that in each game,…

We have previously presented a critique of the standard Marshallian theory of the firm, and developed an alternative formulation that better agreed with the results of simulation. An incorrect mathematical fact was used in our previous…