Related papers: The Complexity of Agreement
Social reasoning - inferring unobservable beliefs and intentions from partial observations of other agents - remains a challenging task for large language models (LLMs). We evaluate the limits of current reasoning language models in the…
We introduce a new concept of approximation applicable to decision problems and functions, inspired by Bayesian probability. From the perspective of a Bayesian reasoner with limited computational resources, the answer to a problem that…
One of the main notions of information theory is the notion of mutual information in two messages (two random variables in Shannon information theory or two binary strings in algorithmic information theory). The mutual information in $x$…
Persuasion, a fundamental social capability for humans, remains a challenge for AI systems such as large language models (LLMs). Current studies often overlook the strategic use of information asymmetry in message design or rely on strong…
We study the merging and the testing of opinions in the context of a prediction model. In the absence of incentive problems, opinions can be tested and rejected, regardless of whether or not data produces consensus among Bayesian agents. In…
Models of continuous opinion dynamics under bounded confidence have been presented independently by Krause and Hegselmann and by Deffuant et al in 2000. They have raised a fair amount of attention in the communities of social simulation,…
An algorithm for $n-1$-strong-equillibrium for distributed consensus in a ring with rational agents was proposed by Afek et al. (2014). A proof of impossibility of $n-1$-strong-equillibrium for distributed consensus in every topology with…
We examine strategy-proof elections to select a winner amongst a set of agents, each of whom cares only about winning. This impartial selection problem was introduced independently by Holzman and Moulin and Alon et al. Fisher and Klimm…
The literature on strategic communication originated with the influential cheap talk model, which precedes the Bayesian persuasion model by three decades. This model describes an interaction between two agents: sender and receiver. The…
Bayesian inference has theoretical attractions as a principled framework for reasoning about beliefs. However, the motivations of Bayesian inference which claim it to be the only 'rational' kind of reasoning do not apply in practice. They…
Bayesian persuasion, a central model in information design, studies how a sender, who privately observes a state drawn from a prior distribution, strategically sends a signal to influence a receiver's action. A key assumption is that both…
Due to the wide application of average consensus algorithm, its security and privacy problems have attracted great attention. In this paper, we consider the system threatened by a set of unknown agents that are both "malicious" and…
We study an opinion dynamics model in which agents reach compromise via pairwise interactions. When the opinions of two agents are sufficiently close, they both acquire the average of their initial opinions; otherwise, they do not interact.…
Suppose that multiple experts (or learning algorithms) provide us with alternative Bayesian network (BN) structures over a domain, and that we are interested in combining them into a single consensus BN structure. Specifically, we are…
This paper explores the emergence of norms in agents' societies when agents play multiple -even incompatible- roles in their social contexts simultaneously, and have limited interaction ranges. Specifically, this article proposes two…
This paper builds a model of interactive belief hierarchies to derive the conditions under which judging an arbitrage opportunity requires Bayesian market participants to exercise their higher-order beliefs. As a Bayesian, an agent must…
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings where good decisions require forming beliefs over the probability of unknown outcomes. However, it is unclear whether LLMs act as if they hold coherent beliefs…
We consider the $\varepsilon$-Consensus-Halving problem, in which a set of heterogeneous agents aim at dividing a continuous resource into two (not necessarily contiguous) portions that all of them simultaneously consider to be of…
Negotiation is a very common interaction between automated agents. Many common negotiation protocols work with cardinal utilities, even though ordinal preferences, which only rank the outcomes, are easier to elicit from humans. In this work…
A set of mutually distrusting participants that want to agree on a common opinion must solve an instance of a Byzantine agreement problem. These problems have been extensively studied in the literature. However, most of the existing…