Related papers: Modeling Belief in Dynamic Systems, Part II: Revis…
This paper proposes a unified theoretical model to identify and test a comprehensive set of probabilistic updating biases within a single framework. The model achieves separate identification by focusing on the updating of belief…
Logic programs under the stable model semantics, or answer-set programs, provide an expressive rule-based knowledge representation framework, featuring a formal, declarative and well-understood semantics. However, handling the evolution of…
We look at the problem of revising fuzzy belief bases, i.e., belief base revision in which both formulas in the base as well as revision-input formulas can come attached with varying truth-degrees. Working within a very general framework…
A critical issue in the evolution of software models is change propagation: given a primary change that is made to a model in order to meet a new or changed requirement, what additional secondary changes are needed to maintain consistency…
The growing use of AI-generated responses in everyday tools raises concern about how subtle features such as supporting detail or tone of confidence may shape people's beliefs. To understand this, we conducted a pre-registered online…
The (extended) AGM postulates for belief revision seem to deal with the revision of a given theory K by an arbitrary formula, but not to constrain the revisions of two different theories by the same formula. A new postulate is proposed and…
In this paper we address the interplay among intention, time, and belief in dynamic environments. The first contribution is a logic for reasoning about intention, time and belief, in which assumptions of intentions are represented by…
We propose a framework for general Bayesian inference. We argue that a valid update of a prior belief distribution to a posterior can be made for parameters which are connected to observations through a loss function rather than the…
The AGM theory of belief revision has become an important paradigm for investigating rational belief changes. Unfortunately, researchers working in this paradigm have restricted much of their attention to rather simple representations of…
The notion of argumentation and the one of belief stand in a problematic relation to one another. On the one hand, argumentation is crucial for belief formation: as the outcome of a process of arguing, an agent might come to (justifiably)…
The belief revision field is opulent in new proposals and indigent in analyses of existing approaches. Much work hinge on postulates, employed as syntactic characterizations: some revision mechanism is equivalent to some properties.…
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly support heterogeneous tasks within a single interface, requiring users to form, update, and act upon beliefs about one system across domains with different reliability profiles. Understanding how…
This paper extends the applications of belief-networks to include the revision of belief commitments, i.e., the categorical acceptance of a subset of hypotheses which, together, constitute the most satisfactory explanation of the evidence…
The dynamics of belief and knowledge is one of the major components of any autonomous system that should be able to incorporate new pieces of information. We show that knowledge base dynamics has interesting connection with kernel change…
Do language models have beliefs about the world? Dennett (1995) famously argues that even thermostats have beliefs, on the view that a belief is simply an informational state decoupled from any motivational state. In this paper, we discuss…
A Bayesian view of data interpretation suggests that a visualization user should update their existing beliefs about a parameter's value in accordance with the amount of information about the parameter value captured by the new…
Belief integration methods are often aimed at deriving a single and consistent knowledge base that retains as much as possible of the knowledge bases to integrate. The rationale behind this approach is the minimal change principle: the…
In this contribution we explore choice revision, a sort of belief change in which the new information is represented by a set of sentences and the agent could accept some of the sentences while rejecting the others. We propose a generalized…
Within the formal setting of the Lockean thesis, an agent belief set is defined in terms of degrees of confidence and these are described in probabilistic terms. This approach is of established interest, notwithstanding some limitations…
We present a general, consistency-based framework for belief change. Informally, in revising K by A, we begin with A and incorporate as much of K as consistently possible. Formally, a knowledge base K and sentence A are expressed, via…