Related papers: Belief Revision: A Critique

In action domains where agents may have erroneous beliefs, reasoning about the effects of actions involves reasoning about belief change. In this paper, we use a transition system approach to reason about the evolution of an agents beliefs…

This paper deals with belief base revision that is a form of belief change consisting of the incorporation of new facts into an agent's beliefs represented by a finite set of propositional formulas. In the aim to guarantee more reliability…

The belief revision field is opulent in new proposals and indigent in analyses of existing approaches. Much work hinge on postulates, employed as syntactic characterizations: some revision mechanism is equivalent to some properties.…

The notion of argumentation and the one of belief stand in a problematic relation to one another. On the one hand, argumentation is crucial for belief formation: as the outcome of a process of arguing, an agent might come to (justifiably)…

Belief revision is the process in which an agent incorporates a new piece of information together with a pre-existing set of beliefs. When the new information comes in the form of a report from another agent, then it is clear that we must…

AGM's belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the study of belief change operations. In this context, belief bases (prioritised bases) have been primarily used to specify the agent's belief state. While the connection of iterated…

We investigate the belief revision problem in epistemic planning, i.e., what will be the beliefs of all agents in a multi-agent system after an agent gains the belief in some state property. Based on the standard representation in epistemic…

Belief revision has been studied mainly with respect to background logics that are monotonic in character. In this paper we study belief revision when the underlying logic is non-monotonic instead--an inherently interesting problem that is…

Understanding how humans revise their beliefs in light of new information is crucial for developing AI systems which can effectively model, and thus align with, human reasoning. While theoretical belief revision frameworks rely on a set of…

This paper deals with the revision of partially ordered beliefs. It proposes a semantic representation of epistemic states by partial pre-orders on interpretations and a syntactic representation by partially ordered belief bases. Two…

We propose a new approach to belief revision that provides a way to change knowledge bases with a minimum of effort. We call this way of revising belief states optimal belief revision. Our revision method gives special attention to the fact…

Choice revision is a sort of non-prioritized multiple revision, in which the agent partially accepts the new information represented by a set of sentences. We investigate the construction of choice revision based on a new approach to belief…

The (extended) AGM postulates for belief revision seem to deal with the revision of a given theory K by an arbitrary formula, but not to constrain the revisions of two different theories by the same formula. A new postulate is proposed and…

Traditional logic-based belief revision research focuses on designing rules to constrain the behavior of revision operators. Frameworks have been proposed to characterize iterated revision rules, but they are often too loose, leading to…

I propose a framework for an agent to change its probabilistic beliefs when a new piece of propositional information $\alpha$ is observed. Traditionally, belief change occurs by either a revision process or by an update process, depending…

The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. In a companion paper, we introduce a new framework…

In the classic AGM belief revision theory, beliefs are static and do not change their own shape. For instance, if p is accepted by a rational agent, it will remain p to the agent. But such rarely happens to us. Often, when we accept some…

In this contribution we explore choice revision, a sort of belief change in which the new information is represented by a set of sentences and the agent could accept some of the sentences while rejecting the others. We propose a generalized…

The axiom of recovery, while capturing a central intuition regarding belief change, has been the source of much controversy. We argue briefly against putative counterexamples to the axiom--while agreeing that some of their insight deserves…

In the field of knowledge representation, the considered epistemic states are often based on propositional interpretations, also called worlds. E.g., epistemic states of agents can be modelled by ranking functions or total preorders on…