Related papers: A Consistency-Based Model for Belief Change: Preli…
In this contribution we explore choice revision, a sort of belief change in which the new information is represented by a set of sentences and the agent could accept some of the sentences while rejecting the others. We propose a generalized…
We propose a new approach to belief revision that provides a way to change knowledge bases with a minimum of effort. We call this way of revising belief states optimal belief revision. Our revision method gives special attention to the fact…
This paper deals with belief base revision that is a form of belief change consisting of the incorporation of new facts into an agent's beliefs represented by a finite set of propositional formulas. In the aim to guarantee more reliability…
Belief revision of knowledge bases represented by a set of sentences in a given logic has been extensively studied but for specific logics, mainly propositional, and also recently Horn and description logics. Here, we propose to generalize…
Belief integration methods are often aimed at deriving a single and consistent knowledge base that retains as much as possible of the knowledge bases to integrate. The rationale behind this approach is the minimal change principle: the…
Choice revision is a sort of non-prioritized multiple revision, in which the agent partially accepts the new information represented by a set of sentences. We investigate the construction of choice revision based on a new approach to belief…
A belief base revision is developed. The belief base is represented using Unified Answer Set Programs which is capable of representing imprecise and uncertain information and perform nonomonotonic reasoning with them. The base revision…
We propose a new paradigm for Belief Change in which the new information is represented as sets of models, while the agent's body of knowledge is represented as a finite set of formulae, that is, a finite base. The focus on finiteness is…
I propose a framework for an agent to change its probabilistic beliefs when a new piece of propositional information $\alpha$ is observed. Traditionally, belief change occurs by either a revision process or by an update process, depending…
We provide a new characterization of both belief update and belief revision in terms of a Kripke-Lewis semantics. We consider frames consisting of a set of states, a Kripke belief relation and a Lewis selection function. Adding a valuation…
The (extended) AGM postulates for belief revision seem to deal with the revision of a given theory K by an arbitrary formula, but not to constrain the revisions of two different theories by the same formula. A new postulate is proposed and…
Traditional logic-based belief revision research focuses on designing rules to constrain the behavior of revision operators. Frameworks have been proposed to characterize iterated revision rules, but they are often too loose, leading to…
In this paper we introduce a nonmonotonic framework for belief revision in which reasoning about the reliability of different pieces of information based on meta-knowledge about the information is possible, and where revision strategies can…
Understanding how humans revise their beliefs in light of new information is crucial for developing AI systems which can effectively model, and thus align with, human reasoning. While theoretical belief revision frameworks rely on a set of…
We propose a general framework for inconsistency-tolerant query answering within existential rule setting. This framework unifies the main semantics proposed by the state of art and introduces new ones based on cardinality and majority…
Knowledge Measures (KMs) aim at quantifying the amount of knowledge/information that a knowledge base carries. On the other hand, Belief Change (BC) is the process of changing beliefs (in our case, in terms of contraction, expansion and…
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. In a companion paper (Friedman & Halpern, 1997), we…
Belief change is a fundamental problem in AI: Agents constantly have to update their beliefs to accommodate new observations. In recent years, there has been much work on axiomatic characterizations of belief change. We claim that a better…
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. In a companion paper, we introduce a new framework…
We look at preference change arising out of an interaction between two elements: the first is an initial preference ranking encoding a pre-existing attitude; the second element is new preference information signaling input from an…