Related papers: Microscopic Foundation of Stochastic Game Dynamica…

Mating preferences of many biological species are not constant but season-dependent. Within the framework of evolutionary game theory this can be modeled with two finite opposite-sex populations playing against each other following the…

This paper considers a stochastic approximation algorithm, with decreasing step size and martingale difference noise. Under very mild assumptions, we prove the non convergence of this process toward a certain class of repulsive sets for the…

Interactions among individuals in natural populations often occur in a dynamically changing environment. Understanding the role of environmental variation in population dynamics has long been a central topic in theoretical ecology and…

Evolutionary game theory has been widely used to study the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas where imitation-led strategy updates are typically assumed. However, results of recent behavioral experiments are not compatible with the…

Applying the concepts and formalisms from Evolutionary Game Theory to the data regime, the fundamental paradigms of Evolutionary Data Theory are introduced. Interpreting data in matrix form as evolutionary entities, input data is mapped to…

Recent results and interpretations are presented for the thermal minority game, concentrating on deriving and justifying the fundamental stochastic differential equation for the microdynamics.

Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…

Evolutionary graph theory is a well established framework for modelling the evolution of social behaviours in structured populations. An emerging consensus in this field is that graphs that exhibit heterogeneity in the number of connections…

The evolutionary mechanisms of cooperative behavior represent a fundamental topic in complex systems and evolutionary dynamics. Real-world collective interactions, particularly in multi-agent systems, are often characterized by…

An ensemble of classical subsystems interacting with surrounding particles has been considered. In general case, a phase volume of the subsystems ensemble was shown to be a function of time. The evolutional equations of the ensemble are…

Building upon the eco-evolutionary game dynamics framework established by Tilman et al., we investigate stochastic fluctuations in a two-strategy system incorporating environmental feedback mechanisms, where the payoff matrix exhibits…

We study the asymptotic behavior of deterministic, continuous-time imitation dynamics for population games over networks. The basic assumption of this learning mechanism -- encompassing the replicator dynamics -- is that players belonging…

In this paper, a partially observed stochastic linear Stackelberg differential game with mean-variance criteria is studied. Randomness comes from Brownian motions and Poisson random measures. which leads to a circular dependency. We follow…

We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…

A new class of stochastic variables, governed by a specifice set of rules, is introduced. These rules force them to loose some properties usually assumed for this kind of variables. We demonstrate that stochastic processes driven by these…

In this paper we introduce polytopal stochastic games, an extension of two-player, zero-sum, turn-based stochastic games, in which we may have uncertainty over the transition probabilities. In these games the uncertainty over the…

Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can take decisions on which strategy to choose in a game on the basis of simple opinions. These opinions can be modified after each round by…

Random invariant manifolds often provide geometric structures for understanding stochastic dynamics. In this paper, a dynamical approximation estimate is derived for a class of stochastic partial differential equations, by showing that the…

We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…

Individual cooperative strategy influences the surrounding dynamic population, which in turn affects cooperative strategy. To better model this phenomenon, we develop a Markov decision chain based game transitions model and examine the…