Related papers: On the Minority Game : Analytical and Numerical St…
In this paper, we deal with some specific domains of applications to game theory. This is one of the major class of models in the new approaches of modelling in the economic domain. For that, we use genetic automata which allow to buid…
We consider the adaptive learning rule of Harley (1981) for behavior selection in symmetric conflict games in large populations. The rule uses organisms' past, accumulated rewards as the predictor for the future behavior, and can be traced…
We consider two-player combinatorial games in which the graph of positions is random and perhaps infinite, focusing on directed Galton-Watson trees. As the offspring distribution is varied, a game can undergo a phase transition, in which…
We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the…
We study the role of strategy correlations and timing of adaptation for the dynamics of Minority Games, both simulationally and analytically. Using the exact generating functional approach a la De Dominicis we compute the phase diagram and…
We discuss a modification of the Evolutionary Minority Game (EMG) in which agents are placed in the nodes of a regular or a random graph. A neighborhood for each agent can thus be defined and a modification of the usual relaxation dynamics…
We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…
Evolutionary game theory is a common framework to study the evolution of cooperation, where it is usually assumed that the same game is played in all interactions. Here, we investigate a model where the game that is played by two…
We study a stochastic process that mimics single-game elimination tournaments. In our model, the outcome of each match is stochastic: the weaker player wins with upset probability q<=1/2, and the stronger player wins with probability 1-q.…
We study the role of imitation within the Minority Game model of market. The players can exchange information locally, which leads to formation of groups which act as if they were single players. Coherent spatial areas of rich and poor…
Sustainable resource use in large societies requires social institutions that specify acceptable behavior and punish violators. Because mutual monitoring becomes prohibitively costly as populations grow, we examine whether sustainability…
We use the indirect evolutionary approach to study evolutionarily stable preferences against multiple mutations in single- and multi-population matching settings, respectively. Players choose strategies to maximize their subjective…
Controlling evolutionary game-theoretic dynamics is a problem of paramount importance for the systems and control community, with several applications spanning from social science to engineering. Here, we study a population of individuals…
Starting with Darwin, biologists have asked how populations evolve from a low fitness state that is evolutionarily stable to a high fitness state that is not. Specifically of interest is the emergence of cooperation and multicellularity…
In the evolutionary version of the minority game, agents update their strategies (gene-value $p$) in order to improve their performance. Motivated by recent intriguing results obtained for prize-to-fine ratios which are smaller than unity,…
We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…
Diverse communities of competing species are generally characterized by substantial niche overlap and strongly stochastic dynamics. Abundance fluctuations are proportional to population size, so the dynamics of rare populations is slower.…
While game theory is widely used to model strategic interactions, a natural question is where do the game representations come from? One answer is to learn the representations from data. If one wants to learn both the payoffs and the…
We apply Game Theory to a mathematical representation of two competing teams of agents connected within a complex network, where the ability of each side to manoeuvre their resource and degrade that of the other depends on their ability to…
Evolutionary game dynamics is one of the most fruitful frameworks for studying evolution in different disciplines, from Biology to Economics. Within this context, the approach of choice for many researchers is the so-called replicator…