Related papers: Scaling Behavior in the Stable Marriage Problem
Stable marriage of a two-sided market with unit demand is a classic problem that arises in many real-world scenarios. In addition, a unique stable marriage in this market simplifies a host of downstream desiderata. In this paper, we explore…
In this paper we consider the problem of finding stable maxima of expensive (to evaluate) functions. We are motivated by the optimisation of physical and industrial processes where, for some input ranges, small and unavoidable variations in…
In the stable marriage problem (SM), a mechanism that always outputs a stable matching is called a stable mechanism. One of the well-known stable mechanisms is the man-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm (MGS). MGS has a good property that it…
We introduce a new and broader formulation of the stable marriage problem (SMP), called the stable polygamy problem (SPP), where multiple individuals from a larger group $L$ of $|L|$ individuals can be matched with a single individual from…
Are you having trouble getting married? These days, there are lots of products on the market for dating, from apps to websites and matchmakers, but we know a simpler way! That's right -- your path to coupled life isn't through Tinder: it's…
In the Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of the agents into pairs, in which no two agents have an incentive to deviate from their assignment. It is well known that a stable matching is unlikely to exist, but a stable…
We consider a many-to-one variant of the stable matching problem. More concretely, we consider the variant of the stable matching problem where one side has a matroid constraint. Furthermore, we consider the situation where the preference…
In many matching markets--such as athlete recruitment or academic admissions--participants on one side are evaluated by attribute vectors known to the other side, which in turn applies individual \emph{salience vectors} to assign relative…
Following up a recent work by Ashlagi, Kanoria and Leshno, we study a stable matching problem with unequal numbers of men and women, and independent uniform preferences. The asymptotic formulas for the expected number of stable matchings,…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
We consider the problem of optimizing the steady state of a dynamical system in closed loop. Conventionally, the design of feedback optimization control laws assumes that the system is stationary. However, in reality, the dynamics of the…
We prove existence and uniqueness of solutions, continuous dependence from the initial datum and stability with respect to the boundary condition in a class of initial--boundary value problems for systems of balance laws. The particular…
We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are $\ell$ layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences,…
A popular method for selecting the number of clusters is based on stability arguments: one chooses the number of clusters such that the corresponding clustering results are "most stable". In recent years, a series of papers has analyzed the…
We study the Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorces (DivorceSM) problem of deciding, given a Stable Marriage instance and an initial matching $M$ , whether there exists a stable matching which is reachable from $M$ by divorce operations as…
We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classic definition of stability by Gale and Shapley (1962). Informally speaking, robustness…
In this paper, we begin by discussing different types of preference profiles related to the stable marriage problem. We then introduce the concept of soulmates, which are a man and a woman who rank each other first. Inversely, we examine…
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals, where each institution may be matched to multiple individuals. The matching market includes couples, who view pairs of institutions as complementary. Institutions'…
This work presents a hybrid approach to solve the maximum stable set problem, using constraint and semidefinite programming. The approach consists of two steps: subproblem generation and subproblem solution. First we rank the variable…
Robust Stable Marriage (RSM) is a variant of the classical Stable Marriage problem, where the robustness of a given stable matching is measured by the number of modifications required for repairing it in case an unforeseen event occurs. We…