Related papers: Fluctuations around Nash Equilibria in Game Theory

A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system…

To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…

In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…

Methods of exploring Nash equilibrium in quantum games are studied. Analytical conditions of the existence, the uniqueness or the multiplicity of the equilibria are found.

Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…

We investigate the degree of discontinuity of several solution concepts from non-cooperative game theory. While the consideration of Nash equilibria forms the core of our work, also pure and correlated equilibria are dealt with. Formally,…

We study a static game played by a finite number of agents, in which agents are assigned independent and identically distributed random types and each agent minimizes its objective function by choosing from a set of admissible actions that…

Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…

A Nash equilibrium has become important solution concept for analyzing the decision making in Game theory. In this paper, we consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria of a subclass of generic finite normal form games. We define…

Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at maximizing their own payoffs. There exists a game among these…

This paper develops a novel methodology to study robust stability properties of Nash equilibrium points in dynamic games. Small-gain techniques in modern mathematical control theory are used for the first time to derive conditions…

Learning processes in games explain how players grapple with one another in seeking an equilibrium. We study a natural model of learning based on individual gradients in two-player continuous games. In such games, the arguably natural…

A systematic theory is introduced that describes stochastic effects in game theory. In a biological context, such effects are relevant for the evolution of finite populations with frequency-dependent selection. They are characterized by…

If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support…

An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium is provided for games in normal form. The Nash equilibrium correspondence is shown to be fully characterized by four simple and intuitive axioms, two of which are inspired by contraction and…

We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability. We do so through the notion of uniform stability, which is concerned with equilibria of individually utility-seeking dynamics. Perhaps surprisingly,…

We discuss similarities and differencies between systems of many interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. We analyze long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many…

The Nash Equilibrium is a much discussed, deceptively complex, method for the analysis of non-cooperative games. If one reads many of the commonly available definitions the description of the Nash Equilibrium is deceptively simple in…

We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a…

We investigate whether having a unique equilibrium (or a given number of equilibria) is robust to perturbation of the payoffs, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We show that the set of n-player finite games with a unique…