Related papers: Coordination, intermittency and trends in generali…
The modelling of evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations requires microscopic processes that determine how strategies spread. The exact details of these processes are often chosen without much further consideration. Different types…
We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…
We study the coevolution of network structure and signaling behavior. We model agents who can preferentially associate with others in a dynamic network while they also learn to play a simple sender-receiver game. We have four major…
We study the dynamics and statics of a dilute batch minority game with random external information. We focus on the case in which the number of connections per agent is infinite in the thermodynamic limit. The dynamical scenario of…
We show analytically how the fluctuations (i.e. standard deviation) in the Minority Game (MG) can be made to decrease below the random coin-toss limit if the agents use more general behavioral strategies. This suppression of the standard…
Using the Minority Game model we study a broad spectrum of problems of market mechanism. We study the role of different types of agents: producers, speculators as well as noise traders. The central issue here is the information flow :…
We study a model of a competing population of N adaptive agents, with similar capabilities, repeatedly deciding whether to attend a bar with an arbitrary cutoff L. Decisions are based upon past outcomes. The agents are only told whether the…
The existence of a phase transition with diverging susceptibility in batch Minority Games (MGs) is the mark of informationally efficient regimes and is linked to the specifics of the agents' learning rules. Here we study how the standard…
Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…
Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote…
This study elaborates some examples of a simple evolutionary stochastic rate process where the population rate of change depends on the distribution of properties--so different cohorts change at different rates. We investigate the effect on…
We study the dynamics of the batch minority game, with random external information, using generating functional techniques a la De Dominicis. The relevant control parameter in this model is the ratio $\alpha=p/N$ of the number $p$ of…
The maintenance of diversity, the `commonness of rarity', and compositional turnover are ubiquitous features of species-rich communities. Through a minimal model, we consider how these features reflect the interplay between environmental…
We examine behavior in an experimental collaboration game that incorporates endogenous network formation. The environment is modeled as a generalization of the voluntary contributions mechanism. By varying the information structure in a…
Collective behavior is studied in globally coupled maps with distributed nonlinearity. It is shown that the heterogeneity enhances regularity in the collective dynamics. Low-dimensional quasiperiodic motion is often found for the…
We present preliminary results on the problem of driving the dynamics of a group of agents, the herders, so as to steer the collective behaviour of another group of agents, the targets, interacting with them. We define this problem as the…
We explore the coupled dynamics of the internal states of a set of interacting elements and the network of interactions among them. Interactions are modeled by a spatial game and the network of interaction links evolves adapting to the…
We discuss a simple version of the Minority Game (MG) in which agents hold only one strategy each, but in which their capitals evolve dynamically according to their success and in which the total trading volume varies in time accordingly.…
In the original Evolutionary Minority Game, a segregation into two populations with opposing preferences is observed under many circumstances. We show that this segregation becomes more pronounced and more robust if the dynamics are changed…
We investigate the dynamics of the choice of an active strategy in the minority game. A history distribution is introduced as an analytical tool to study the asymmetry between the two choices offered to the agents. Its properties are…