Related papers: Invisible Hand Effect in an Evolutionary Minority …
Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally…
We study the effects of the presence of contrarians in an agent-based model of competing populations. Contrarians are common in societies. These contrarians are agents who deliberately prefer to hold an opinion that is contrary to the…
Groups of humans are often able to find ways to cooperate with one another in complex, temporally extended social dilemmas. Models based on behavioral economics are only able to explain this phenomenon for unrealistic stateless matrix…
Coordination and cooperation between humans and autonomous agents in cooperative games raises interesting questions of human decision making and behaviour changes. Here we report our findings from a group formation game in a small-world…
One of the main problems of evolutionary algorithms is the convergence of the population to local minima. In this paper, we explore techniques that can avoid this problem by encouraging a diverse behavior of the agents through a shared…
The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how…
Involution now refers to the phenomenon that competitors in the same field make more efforts to struggle for limited resources but get lower individual ''profit effort ratio''. In this work, we investigate the evolution of the involution…
The minority model was introduced to study the competition between agents with limited information. It has the remarkable feature that, as the amount of information available increases, the collective gain made by the agents is reduced.…
The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away…
We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant…
We use the Minority Game as a testing frame for the problem of the emergence of diversity in socio-economic systems. For the MG with heterogeneous impacts, we show that the direct generalization of the usual agents' profit does not fit some…
Human societies around the world interact with each other by developing and maintaining social norms, and it is critically important to understand how such norms emerge and change. In this work, we define an evolutionary game-theoretic…
Based on the adiabatic theory for the evolutionary minority game (EMG) that we proposed earlier[1], we perform a detail analysis of the EMG limited to three groups of agents. We derive a formula for the critical point of the transition from…
We investigate an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game among self-driven agents, where collective motion of biological flocks is imitated through averaging directions of neighbors. Depending on the temptation to defect and the velocity at…
We propose a payoff function extending Minority Games (MG) that captures the competition between agents to make money. In constrast with previous MG, the best strategies are not always targeting the minority but are shifting…
This paper presents a simple agent-based model of an economic system, populated by agents playing different games according to their different view about social cohesion and tax payment. After a first set of simulations, correctly…
We study overpricing in a repeated game between two representative agents: a market maker, who controls market liquidity, and a market taker, who chooses trade quantities. Market prices evolve through the endogenous price impact of trades…
We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There is a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with…
Evolutionary game theory has traditionally assumed that all individuals in a population interact with each other between reproduction events. We show that eliminating this restriction by explicitly considering the time scales of interaction…
In social situations with which evolutionary game is concerned, individuals are considered to be heterogeneous in various aspects. In particular, they may differently perceive the same outcome of the game owing to heterogeneity in…