Related papers: Co-evolutionary games on networks
We simulate the prisoner's dilemma and hawk-dove games on a real social acquaintance network. Using a discrete analogue of replicator dynamics, we show that surprisingly high levels of cooperation can be achieved, contrary to what happens…
Evolutionary game theory has been successfully used to investigate the dynamics of systems, in which many entities have competitive interactions. From a physics point of view, it is interesting to study conditions under which a coordination…
We study the emergency of mutual cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games when the players are located on a square lattice. The players can choose one of the three strategies: cooperation (C), defection (D) or "tit for tat" (T),…
In this paper, we study a model of network formation in large populations. Each agent can choose the strength of interaction (i.e. connection) with other agents to find a Nash equilibrium. Different from the recently-developed theory of…
In a network game, players interact over a network and the utility of each player depends on his own action and on an aggregate of his neighbours' actions. Many real world networks of interest are asymmetric and involve a large number of…
In this paper, we investigate the dynamics of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents in a coevolutionary model for actions and opinions. In the model, the individuals of a population interact on a two-layer network, sharing their…
We investigate the evolution of cooperation on a non - growth network model with death/birth dynamics. Nodes reproduce under selection for higher payoffs in a prisoners dilemma game played between network neighbours. The mean field…
We consider the basic problem of approximating Nash equilibria in noncooperative games. For monotone games, we design continuous time flows which converge in an averaged sense to Nash equilibria. We also study mean field equilibria, which…
In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation…
In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the…
This paper develops a distributed resource allocation game to study countries' pursuit of targets such as self-survival in the networked international environment. The contributions are two. First, the game formalizes countries' power…
In this paper, we use a model of large random network game where the agents plays selfishly and are affected by their neighbors, to explore the conditions under which the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game is affected by a perturbation in…
Evolutionary games are a developing sub-field of game theory. This branch of game theory is used in the study of the adaptation of large, but finite, populations of agents to changes in the environment. It assumes that each agent has no…
We consider a class of Wasserstein distributionally robust Nash equilibrium problems, where agents construct heterogeneous data-driven Wasserstein ambiguity sets using private samples and radii, in line with their individual risk-averse…
In evolutionary game theory an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept that is sometimes also recognized as evolutionary stability. It is a game-theoretic model, well known to mathematical…
Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…
Game-theoretic solution concepts, such as the Nash equilibrium, have been key to finding stable joint actions in multi-player games. However, it has been shown that the dynamics of agents' interactions, even in simple two-player games with…
Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game is studied where initially all players are linked via a regular graph, having four neighbors each. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players are allowed to make new…
The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how…
A generic property of biological, social and economical networks is their ability to evolve in time, creating and suppressing interactions. We approach this issue within the framework of an adaptive network of agents playing a Prisoner's…