Related papers: Statistics of stable marriages
In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. In the classic variant, it is assumed that both sides of the market submit a ranked list of all agents on the other side. However,…
Stable marriage of a two-sided market with unit demand is a classic problem that arises in many real-world scenarios. In addition, a unique stable marriage in this market simplifies a host of downstream desiderata. In this paper, we explore…
In order to analyze the dynamics of two languages in competition, one approach is to fit historical data on their numbers of speakers with a mathematical model in which the parameters are interpreted as the similarity between those…
We present a revealed preference characterization of marital stability where some couples are committed. A couple is committed if they can divorce only with mutual consent. We provide theoretical insights into the potential of the…
Consider the stable matching problem on two sets. We introduce the concept of a preference cycle and show how its natural presence in stable matchings proves a series of classical results in an elementary way.
In IWOCA 2019, Ruangwises and Itoh introduced stable noncrossing matchings, where participants of each side are aligned on each of two parallel lines, and no two matching edges are allowed to cross each other. They defined two stability…
In this work we consider the problem of extracting a set of interaction parameters from an high-dimensional dataset describing T independent configurations of a complex system composed of N binary units. This problem is formulated in the…
We present a revealed preference framework to study sharing of resources in households with children. We explicitly model the impact of the presence of children in the context of stable marriage markets under both potential types of custody…
Statistical matching is an effective method for estimating causal effects in which treated units are paired with control units with ``similar'' values of confounding covariates prior to performing estimation. In this way, matching helps…
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both…
This paper focuses on two-sided matching where one side (a hospital or firm) is matched to the other side (a doctor or worker) so as to maximize a cardinal objective under general feasibility constraints. In a standard model, even though…
In this paper we study the continuous dependence with respect to obstacles for obstacle problems with measure data. This is deeply investigated introducing a suitable type of convergence, which gives stability under very general hypotheses.…
Motivated by group-project distribution, we introduce and study stable matching under the constraint of applicants needing to share a location to be matched with the same institute, which we call the Location-Restricted Stable Matching…
We study generically stable types/measures in both classical and continuous logics, and their connection with randomization and modes of convergence of types/measures.
We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts: ordinal stability [Aharoni and Fleiner, Journal of…
Standard neutral population genetics theory with a strictly fixed population size has important limitations. An alternative model that allows independently fluctuating population sizes and reproduces the standard neutral evolution is…
We define and study a new variant of the secretary problem. Whereas in the classic setting multiple secretaries compete for a single position, we study the case where the secretaries arrive one at a time and are assigned, in an on-line…
We show how fragile stable matchings are in a decentralized one-to-one matching setting. The classical work of Roth and Vande Vate (1990) suggests simple decentralized dynamics in which randomly-chosen blocking pairs match successively.…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
It is well known that every stable matching instance $I$ has a rotation poset $R(I)$ that can be computed efficiently and the downsets of $R(I)$ are in one-to-one correspondence with the stable matchings of $I$. Furthermore, for every poset…