Related papers: Segregation in a competing and evolving population
We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…
We model the dynamics of social structure by a simple interacting particle system. The social standing of an individual agent is represented by an integer-valued fitness that changes via two offsetting processes. When two agents interact…
We study the evolution of preferences in multi-population settings that allow matches across distinct populations. Each individual has subjective preferences over potential outcomes, and chooses a best response based on his preferences and…
Evolutionary game theory is a successful mathematical framework geared towards understanding the selective pressures that affect the evolution of the strategies of agents engaged in interactions with potential conflicts. While a…
We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations are strongly affected by updating rules. Previous studies usually focus on imitation-based rules, which rely on payoff information of social peers. Recent behavioral experiments suggest…
Different evolutionary models are known to make disparate predictions for the success of an invading mutant in some situations. For example, some evolutionary mechanics lead to amplification of selection in structured populations, while…
We present a detailed discussion of the role played by memory, and the nature of self-induced shocks, in an evolutionary population competing for limited resources. Our study builds on a previously introduced multi-agent system [Phys. Rev.…
In nature and human societies, the effects of homogeneous and heterogeneous characteristics on the evolution of collective behaviors are quite different from each other. It is of great importance to understand the underlying mechanisms of…
Schelling's segregation model is a landmark model in sociology. It shows the counter-intuitive phenomenon that residential segregation between individuals of different groups can emerge even when all involved individuals are tolerant.…
We continue our study of evolution in minority games by examining games in which agents with poorly performing strategies can trade in their strategies for new ones from a different strategy space. In the context of the games discussed in…
Simple agent based exchange models are a commonplace in the study of wealth distribution in an artificial economy. Generally, in a system that is composed of many agents characterized by their wealth and risk-aversion factor, two agents are…
We study the dynamics and resulting score distribution of three-agent games where after each competition a single agent wins and scores a point. A single competition is described by a triplet of numbers $p$, $t$ and $q$ denoting the…
We propose a simple model that describes the dynamics of efficiencies of competing agents. Agents communicate leading to increase of efficiencies of underachievers, and an efficiency of each agent can increase or decrease irrespectively of…
We present the results of detailed numerical study of a model for the sharing and sorting of informations in a community consisting of a large number of agents. The information gathering takes place in a sequence of mutual bipartite…
We analyze a simple model of adaptive competition which captures essential features of a variety of adaptive competitive systems in the social and biological sciences. Each of N agents, at each time step of a game, joins one of two groups.…
We study the behaviour of a Schelling-class system in which a fraction $f$ of spatially-fixed switching agents is introduced. This new model allows for multiple interpretations, including: (i) random, non-preferential allocation…
We present results for the so-called `bar-attendance' model of market behavior: $p$ adaptive agents, each possessing $n$ prediction rules chosen randomly from a pool, attempt to attend a bar whose cut-off is $s$. The global attendance…
How should dispersal strategies be chosen to increase the likelihood of survival of a species? We obtain the answer for the spatially extended versions of three well-known models of two competing species with unequal diffusivities. Though…
We consider a heterogeneous agent-based economic model where economic agents have strictly bounded rationality and where income allocation strategies evolve through selective imitation. Income is calculated by a Cobb-Douglas type production…