Related papers: Evolution in Minority Games II. Games with Variabl…
Complex social behaviors lie at the heart of many of the challenges facing evolutionary biology, sociology, economics, and beyond. For evolutionary biologists in particular the question is often how such behaviors can arise \textit{de novo}…
Traditional evolutionary game theory describes how certain strategy spreads throughout the system where individual player imitates the most successful strategy among its neighborhood. Accordingly, player doesn't have own authority to change…
We study effects of strategy-dependent time delays on equilibria of evolving populations. It is well known that time delays may cause oscillations in dynamical systems. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that microscopic models of…
Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical approach to studying how social behaviors evolve. In many recent works, evolutionary competition between strategies is modeled as a stochastic process in a finite population. In this context, two…
We consider a model of nomadic agents exploring and competing for time-varying location-specific resources, arising in crowdsourced transportation services, online communities, and in traditional location based economic activity. This model…
Mean Field Games (MFGs) can potentially scale multi-agent systems to extremely large populations of agents. Yet, most of the literature assumes a single initial distribution for the agents, which limits the practical applications of MFGs.…
Evolutionary game theory has been an important tool for describing economic and social behaviour for decades. Approximate mean value equations describing the time evolution of strategy concentrations can be derived from the players'…
People make strategic decisions many times a day - during negotiations, when coordinating actions with others, or when choosing partners for cooperation. The resulting dynamics can be studied with learning theory and evolutionary game…
We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…
We present an agent-based model of microscopic wealth exchange in a dynamic network to study the topological features associated with economic inequality. The model evolves through two alternating processes, the conservative exchange of…
Resource allocation systems provide the fundamental support for the normal functioning and well being of the modern society, and can be modeled as minority games. A ubiquitous dynamical phenomenon is the emergence of herding, where a vast…
Wealthy individuals may be less tempted to defect than those with comparatively low payoffs. To take this into consideration, we introduce coevolutionary success-driven multigames in structured populations. While the core game is always the…
We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful…
We use the Minority Game as a testing frame for the problem of the emergence of diversity in socio-economic systems. For the MG with heterogeneous impacts, we show that the direct generalization of the usual agents' profit does not fit some…
Here we will use results of Cox, Durrett, and Perkins for voter model perturbations to study spatial evolutionary games on $Z^d$, $d\ge 3$ when the interaction kernel is finite range, symmetric, and has covariance matrix $\sigma^2I$. The…
Evolutionary game dynamics describes not only frequency dependent genetical evolution, but also cultural evolution in humans. In this context, successful strategies spread by imitation. It has been shown that the details of strategy update…
We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the…
In repeated games, such as auctions, players rely on autonomous learning agents to choose their actions. We study settings in which players have their agents make monetary transfers to other agents during play at their own expense, in order…
We consider evolutionary games in which the agent selected for update compares their payoff to q neighbours, rather than a single neighbour as in standard evolutionary game theory. Through studying fixed point stability and fixation times…
We analyze a simple model of adaptive competition which captures essential features of a variety of adaptive competitive systems in the social and biological sciences. Each of N agents, at each time step of a game, joins one of two groups.…