Related papers: Credibility Trilemma in Polymatroidal Service Mark…
We study fair resource allocation with strategic agents. It is well-known that, across multiple fundamental problems in this domain, truthfulness and fairness are incompatible. For example, when allocating indivisible goods, no truthful and…
Our aim is to design mechanisms that motivate all agents to reveal their predictions truthfully and promptly. For myopic agents, proper scoring rules induce truthfulness. However, as has been described in the literature, when agents take…
Dynamic, risk-based pricing can systematically exclude vulnerable consumer groups from essential resources such as health insurance and consumer credit. We show that a regulator can realign private incentives with social objectives through…
The importance of supply chain management in analyzing and later catalyzing economic expectations while simultaneously prioritizing cleaner production aspects is a vital component of modern finance. Such predictions, though, are often known…
The design of energy markets is a subject of ongoing debate, particularly concerning the choice between the widely adopted Pay-as-Clear (PC) pricing mechanism and the alternative Pay-as-Bid (PB). These mechanisms determine how energy…
The CAP theorem states that a distributed system cannot simultaneously guarantee consistency, availability, and partition tolerance under network partition. Inspired by this result, this paper formulates a CAP-like conjecture for Large…
A recent line of work in mechanism design has focused on guaranteeing incentive compatibility for agents without contingent reasoning skills: obviously strategyproof mechanisms guarantee that it is "obvious" for these imperfectly rational…
Sponsored search auctions constitute one of the most successful applications of microeconomic mechanisms. In mechanism design, auctions are usually designed to incentivize advertisers to bid their truthful valuations and to assure both the…
Standard safety alignment optimizes Large Language Models (LLMs) for universal helpfulness and honesty, effectively instilling a rigid "Boy Scout" morality. While robust for general-purpose assistants, this one-size-fits-all ethical…
Large-scale online service platforms face severe challenges from organized platform abuse: multiple forms such as credit card fraud and promotion abuse continually emerge, characterized by large numbers of involved accounts, rapid…
Prediction markets are widely treated as forecasting devices that reveal collective expectations about uncertain futures. This article argues that under specifiable conditions they also function as coordination mechanisms: public…
In decentralized cloud computing marketplaces, ensuring fair and efficient interactions among asset providers and end-users is crucial. A key concern is meeting agreed-upon service-level objectives like the service's reliability. In this…
Motivated by many practical applications, in this paper we study {\em budget feasible mechanisms} where the goal is to procure independent sets from matroids. More specifically, we are given a matroid $\mathcal{M}=(E,\mathcal{I})$ where…
Online platforms in the Internet Economy commonly incorporate recommender systems that recommend products (or "arms") to users (or "agents"). A key challenge in this domain arises from myopic agents who are naturally incentivized to exploit…
Accurate attribution for multiple platforms is critical for evaluating performance-based advertising. However, existing attribution methods rely heavily on the heuristic methods, e.g., Last-Click Mechanism (LCM) which always allocates the…
Concept Bottleneck Models (CBNMs) are deep learning models that provide interpretability by enforcing a bottleneck layer where predictions are based exclusively on human-understandable concepts. However, this constraint also restricts…
Multi-agent systems face a fundamental coordination problem: agents must coordinate despite heterogeneous preferences, asymmetric stakes, and imperfect information. When coordination fails, friction emerges: measurable resistance…
Motivated by applications such as voluntary carbon markets and educational testing, we consider a market for goods with varying but hidden levels of quality in the presence of a third-party certifier. The certifier can provide informative…
We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent bidders with arbitrary demand constraints when either the number of bidders is a constant or the number of items is a constant. In the first…
We study the pricing behavior of third-party platforms facing strategic agents. Assuming the platform is a revenue maximizer, it observes market features that generally affect demand. Since only the equilibrium price and quantity are…