Related papers: State-Robust Nash Predictions In Population Games
We present a unified framework for characterizing local Nash equilibria in continuous games on either infinite-dimensional or finite-dimensional non-convex strategy spaces. We provide intrinsic necessary and sufficient first- and…
We study a class of distributionally robust games where agents are allowed to heterogeneously choose their risk aversion with respect to distributional shifts of the uncertainty. In our formulation, heterogeneous Wasserstein ball…
We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…
This paper studies random reshuffling (RR)-based distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for noncooperative games. The game is motivated as a sample-average approximation of an underlying expected-value stochastic game, while the algorithmic…
We propose local symplectic surgery, a two-timescale procedure for finding local Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. We first show that previous gradient-based algorithms cannot guarantee convergence to local Nash equilibria due…
Performative prediction captures the phenomenon where deploying a predictive model shifts the underlying data distribution. While simple retraining dynamics are known to converge linearly when the performative effects are weak ($\rho < 1$),…
In stochastic Nash equilibrium problems (SNEPs), it is natural for players to be uncertain about their complex environments and have multi-dimensional unknown parameters in their models. Among various SNEPs, this paper focuses on locally…
We consider the problem of learning stable matchings with unknown preferences in a decentralized and uncoordinated manner, where "decentralized" means that players make decisions individually without the influence of a central platform, and…
Multi-agent policy-gradient methods have been shown to converge locally near stable Nash equilibria. Local convergence, however, does not determine which equilibrium is reached. We study this question through basin-entry probability with…
Similar to the role of Markov decision processes in reinforcement learning, Stochastic Games (SGs) lay the foundation for the study of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) and sequential agent interactions. In this paper, we derive…
We establish the existence of fixed points for set-valued maps defined on metric spaces and satisfying a pointwise or a local version of Banach's contraction property. As an application, we demonstrate the existence of Nash equilibrium in a…
Nash Equilibrium and its robust counterpart, Distributionally Robust Nash Equilibrium (DRNE), are fundamental problems in game theory with applications in economics, engineering, and machine learning. This paper addresses the problem of…
Shared-constraint games are noncooperative $N$-player games where players are coupled through a common coupling constraint. It is known that such games admit two kinds of equilibria -- generalized Nash equilibria (GNE) and variational…
Generating payoff matrices of normal-form games at random, we calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble of $n$-player, $m$-strategy games. These are perfectly predictable as they must…
High-precision operation of quantum computing systems must be robust to uncertainties and noises in the quantum hardware. In this paper, we show that through a game played between the uncertainties (or noises) and the controls, adversarial…
We prove the existence of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of general-sum Bayesian games with continuous types and finite actions under the conditions that the utility functions and the prior type distributions are continuous concerning the…
We study the asymptotic stability of the logit evolutionary dynamics in population games, possibly with multiple heterogenous populations. For general population games, we prove that, on the one hand, strict Nash equilibria are…
We consider a class of Wasserstein distributionally robust Nash equilibrium problems, where agents construct heterogeneous data-driven Wasserstein ambiguity sets using private samples and radii, in line with their individual risk-averse…
Consider a strongly monotone game where the players' utility functions include a reward function and a linear term for each dimension, with coefficients that are controlled by the manager. Gradient play converges to a unique Nash…
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an equilibrium strategy that is immune to invasions by rare alternative (``mutant'') strategies. Unlike Nash equilibria, ESS do not always exist in finite games. In this paper we address the…