Related papers: State-Robust Nash Predictions In Population Games
We show that the problem of deciding whether in a multi-player perfect information recursive game (i.e. a stochastic game with terminal rewards) there exists a stationary Nash equilibrium ensuring each player a certain payoff is Existential…
A fundamental problem with the Nash equilibrium concept is the existence of certain "structurally deficient" equilibria that (i) lack fundamental robustness properties, and (ii) are difficult to analyze. The notion of a "regular" Nash…
Computing an equilibrium in congestion games can be challenging when the number of players is large. Yet, it is a problem to be addressed in practice, for instance to forecast the state of the system and be able to control it. In this work,…
The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), introduced by Smith and Price, is a refinement of Nash equilibrium in 2-player symmetric games in order to explain counter-intuitive natural phenomena, whose existence is not…
An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…
We apply Blackwell optimality to repeated games. An equilibrium whose strategy profile is sequentially rational for all high enough discount factors simultaneously is a Blackwell (subgame-perfect, perfect public, etc.) equilibrium. The bite…
In this paper, we consider a distributed Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) seeking problem in incomplete-information aggregative games, which is a generalization of Bayesian games and deterministic aggregative games. We handle the aggregation…
Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…
In this note, we investigate the robustness of Nash equilibria (NE) in multi-player aggregative games with coupling constraints. There are many algorithms for computing an NE of an aggregative game given a known aggregator. When the…
Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…
Real-world games, which concern imperfect information, multiple players, and simultaneous moves, are less frequently discussed in the existing literature of game theory. While reinforcement learning (RL) provides a general framework to…
We consider simple stochastic games with terminal-node rewards and multiple players, who have differing perceptions of risk. Specifically, we study risk-sensitive equilibria (RSEs), where no player can improve their perceived reward --…
Provably efficient and robust equilibrium computation in general-sum Markov games remains a core challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning. Nash equilibrium is computationally intractable in general and brittle due to equilibrium…
Worst-case hardness results for most equilibrium computation problems have raised the need for beyond-worst-case analysis. To this end, we study the smoothed complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in Network Coordination Games, a…
This paper investigates the problem of computing the equilibrium of competitive games, which is often modeled as a constrained saddle-point optimization problem with probability simplex constraints. Despite recent efforts in understanding…
Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions,…
This work proposes a policy learning algorithm for seeking generalised feedback Nash equilibria (GFNE) in $N_P$-player noncooperative dynamic games. We consider linear-quadratic games with stochastic dynamics and design a best-response…
We consider payoff-based learning of a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in multi-agent systems. Our focus is on games with jointly convex constraints of a linear structure and strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. We present a convergent…
We propose the Subgame Credible Nash Equilibrium (SCNE), a refinement of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) for multi-stage games. SCNE retains the internal credibility requirement of SPNE -- equilibrium behavior in every subgame --…
Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…