Related papers: Q-LEAK: Quantum-Based LEAKage Verification for Sid…
Power-based side-channel is a serious security threat to the System on Chip (SoC). The secret information is leaked from the power profile of the system while a cryptographic algorithm is running. The mitigation requires efforts from both…
This presentation focuses on differences between quantum computing and quantum cryptography. Both are discussed related to classical computer systems in terms of vulnerability. Research concerning quantum cryptography is analyzed in terms…
Randomized Benchmarking allows to efficiently and scalably characterize the average error of an unitary 2-design such as the Clifford group $\mathcal{C}$ on a physical candidate for quantum computation, as long as there are no…
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) relies on the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, with which legitimate users are able to estimate information leakage by monitoring the disturbance of the transmitted quantum signals. Normally,…
We present a result of side-channel-secure (SCS) quantum key distribution (QKD) under fully realistic conditions. Our result is not only measurement-device independent but also effective with imperfect (and unstable) source devices…
With the advent of quantum cloud computing, the security of delegated quantum computation has become of utmost importance. While multiple statistically secure blind verification schemes in the prepare-and-send model have been proposed, none…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers the promise of absolutely secure communications. However, proofs of absolute security often assume perfect implementation from theory to experiment. Thus, existing systems may be prone to insidious…
This work presents a new tool to verify the correctness of cryptographic implementations with respect to cache attacks. Our methodology discovers vulnerabilities that are hard to find with other techniques, observed as exploitable leakage.…
We show that a simple eavesdropper listening in on classical communication between potentially entangled quantum parties will eventually be able to impersonate any of the parties. Furthermore, the attack is efficient if one-way puzzles do…
The ability to perform fast and accurate rotations between the computational basis states of quantum bits is one of the most fundamental requirements for building a quantum computer. Because physical qubits generally contain more than two…
Fault injection attacks represent a type of active, physical attack against cryptographic circuits. Various countermeasures have been proposed to thwart such attacks, the design and implementation of which are, however, intricate,…
Power side-channel attacks, which can deduce secret data via statistical analysis, have become a serious threat. Masking is an effective countermeasure for reducing the statistical dependence between secret data and side-channel…
We propose a data-driven method for synthesizing a static analyzer to detect side-channel information leaks in cryptographic software. Compared to the conventional way of manually crafting such a static analyzer, which can be labor…
Quantum computing leverages quantum mechanics to achieve computational advantages over classical hardware, but the use of third-party quantum compilers in the Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) era introduces risks of intellectual…
Quantum codes excel at correcting local noise but fail to correct leakage faults that excite qubits to states outside the computational space. Aliferis and Terhal have shown that an accuracy threshold exists for leakage faults using gadgets…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum message encryption protocols promise a secure way to distribute information while detecting eavesdropping. However, current protocols may suffer from significantly reduced eavesdropping protection…
We explore the possibility of accelerating the formal verification of classical programs with a quantum computer. A common source of security flaws stems from the existence of common programming errors like use after free, null-pointer…
Counterfactual quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two parties to share a secret key using an interaction-free measurement. Here, we point out that the efficiency of counterfactual QKD protocols can be enhanced by including…
In his keynote speech at CHES 2004, Kocher advocated that side-channel attacks were an illustration that formal cryptography was not as secure as it was believed because some assumptions (e.g., no auxiliary information is available during…
We present a general framework for the quantification and characterization of leakage errors that result when a quantum system is encoded in the subspace of a larger system. To do this we introduce new metrics for quantifying the coherent…