Related papers: Formal Verification of Probing Security via Condit…

Large Language Model (LLM) applications are vulnerable to prompt injection and context manipulation attacks that traditional security models cannot prevent. We introduce two novel primitives--authenticated prompts and authenticated…

Lensless cameras replace traditional optics with thin masks, leading to highly multiplexed measurements akin to encryption. However, static masks in conventional designs leave systems vulnerable to simple attacks. This work explores the use…

Due to its sound theoretical basis and practical efficiency, masking has become the most prominent countermeasure to protect cryptographic implementations against physical side-channel attacks (SCAs). The core idea of masking is to randomly…

The risks of frontier AI may require international cooperation, which in turn may require verification: checking that all parties follow agreed-on rules. For instance, states might need to verify that powerful AI models are widely deployed…

In recent times, many protocols have been proposed to provide security for various information and communication systems. Such protocols must be tested for their functional correctness before they are used in practice. Application of formal…

Applying differential privacy at scale requires convenient ways to check that programs computing with sensitive data appropriately preserve privacy. We propose here a fully automated framework for {\em testing} differential privacy,…

Empirical investigations into unintended model behavior often show that the algorithm is predicting another outcome than what was intended. These exposes highlight the need to identify when algorithms predict unintended quantities - ideally…

This work presents a new tool to verify the correctness of cryptographic implementations with respect to cache attacks. Our methodology discovers vulnerabilities that are hard to find with other techniques, observed as exploitable leakage.…

A long-standing research problem in security protocol design is how to efficiently verify security protocols with tamper-resistant global states. In this paper, we address this problem by first proposing a protocol specification framework,…

In this paper, we develop compositional methods for formally verifying differential privacy for algorithms whose analysis goes beyond the composition theorem. Our methods are based on the observation that differential privacy has deep…

Timing side-channel attacks exploit secret-dependent execution time to fully or partially recover secrets of cryptographic implementations, posing a severe threat to software security. Constant-time programming discipline is an effective…

Verifying the security of masked hardware and software implementations, under advanced leakage models, remains a significant challenge, especially then accounting for glitches, transitions and CPU micro-architectural specifics. Existing…

For the formal verification of a network security policy, it is crucial to express the verification goals. These formal goals, called security invariants, should be easy to express for the end user. Focusing on access control and…

Recent years have seen significant advances in using formal verification to check hardware security properties. Of particular practical interest are checking confidentiality and integrity of secrets, by checking that there is no information…

We use Hidden Markov Models to motivate a quantitative compositional semantics for noninterference-based security with iteration, including a refinement- or "implements" relation that compares two programs with respect to their information…

For sensitive text data to be shared among NLP researchers and practitioners, shared documents need to comply with data protection and privacy laws. There is hence a growing interest in automated approaches for text anonymization. However,…

A central challenge in data security is not just preventing theft, but detecting whether it has occurred. Classically, this is impossible because a perfect copy leaves no evidence. Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, forbids general…

We present a formal logic for quantitative reasoning about security properties of network protocols. The system allows us to derive concrete security bounds that can be used to choose key lengths and other security parameters. We provide…

Testing for conditional independence is a core aspect of constraint-based causal discovery. Although commonly used tests are perfect in theory, they often fail to reject independence in practice, especially when conditioning on multiple…

We present and verify template algorithms for lock-free concurrent search structures that cover a broad range of existing implementations based on lists and skiplists. Our linearizability proofs are fully mechanized in the concurrent…