Related papers: Deception and Counter Deception in Adversarial Gra…
We consider a cops and robber game where the cops are blocking edges of a graph, while the robber occupies its vertices. At each round of the game, the cops choose some set of edges to block and right after the robber is obliged to move to…
We consider infinite duration alternating move games. These games were previously studied by Roth, Balcan, Kalai and Mansour. They presented an FPTAS for computing an approximated equilibrium, and conjectured that there is a polynomial…
This paper considers the problem of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in aggregative games, where the payoff function of each player depends on an aggregate of all players' actions. We present a distributed continuous time algorithm such that…
Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games is investigated and a continuous-time algorithm is proposed. The algorithm is designed by virtue of projected gradient play dynamics and distributed average tracking dynamics, and is…
Computing the winning set for B{\"u}chi objectives in alternating games on graphs is a central problem in computer aided verification with a large number of applications. The long standing best known upper bound for solving the problem is…
While many games were designed for steganography and robust watermarking, few focused on reversible watermarking. We present a two-encoder game related to the rate-distortion optimization of content-adaptive reversible watermarking. In the…
How does information regarding an adversary's intentions affect optimal system design? This paper addresses this question in the context of graphical coordination games where an adversary can indirectly influence the behavior of agents by…
This paper considers a game-theoretic formulation of the covert communications problem with finite blocklength, where the transmitter (Alice) can randomly vary her transmit power in different blocks, while the warden (Willie) can randomly…
Adversarial attacks can generate adversarial inputs by applying small but intentionally worst-case perturbations to samples from the dataset, which leads to even state-of-the-art deep neural networks outputting incorrect answers with high…
In this paper we study two-player bilinear zero-sum games with constrained strategy spaces. An instance of natural occurrences of such constraints is when mixed strategies are used, which correspond to a probability simplex constraint. We…
Consider a system in which players at nodes of an underlying graph G repeatedly play Prisoner's Dilemma against their neighbors. The players adapt their strategies based on the past behavior of their opponents by applying the so-called…
The classic Homicidal Chauffeur game is a pursuit-evasion game played in an unbounded planar environment between a pursuer constrained to move with fixed speed on curves with bounded curvature, and a slower evader with fixed speed but with…
We study strongly convex distributed optimization problems where a set of agents are interested in solving a separable optimization problem collaboratively. In this paper, we propose and study a two time-scale decentralized gradient descent…
With the recent advances in solving large, zero-sum extensive form games, there is a growing interest in the inverse problem of inferring underlying game parameters given only access to agent actions. Although a recent work provides a…
We investigate a novel finite-horizon linear-quadratic (LQ) feedback dynamic potential game with a priori unknown cost matrices played between two players. The cost matrices are revealed to the players sequentially, with the potential for…
We consider correlated equilibria in strategic games in an adversarial environment, where an adversary can compromise the public signal used by the players for choosing their strategies, while players aim at detecting a potential attack as…
We study finite-horizon two-player zero-sum differential games with one-sided payoff information ($G$), where the informed player (P1) knows the game payoff, while P2 only has a public belief over a finite set of possible payoffs. In this…
A classic model to study strategic decision making in multi-agent systems is the normal-form game. This model can be generalised to allow for an infinite number of pure strategies leading to continuous games. Multi-objective normal-form…
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is an elegant procedure for finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. It ensures that no pair of agents prefers each other to their matched partners. In this work, we initiate the study…
Robots deployed to the real world must be able to interact with other agents in their environment. Dynamic game theory provides a powerful mathematical framework for modeling scenarios in which agents have individual objectives and…