Related papers: Imperfect Commitment in Maximal Extractable Value …
We describe a plausible probabilistic model for a blockchain queueing environment in which rational, profit-maximising schedulers impose adversarial disciplines on incoming messages containing a payload that encodes a state transition in a…
We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked or not. An advertiser derives value…
Motivated by practical concerns in the online advertising industry, we study a bidder subset selection problem in single-item auctions. In this problem, a large pool of candidate bidders have independent values sampled from known prior…
We investigate revenue guarantees for auction mechanisms in a model where a distribution is specified for each bidder, but only some of the distributions are correct. The subset of bidders whose distribution is correctly specified…
Revert protection is a feature provided by some blockchain platforms that prevents users from incurring fees for failed transactions. We study the economic implications and benefits of revert protection in the context of priority gas…
Sponsored search positions are typically allocated through real-time auctions, where the outcomes depend on advertisers' quality-adjusted bids - the product of their bids and quality scores. Although quality scoring helps promote ads with…
Participation in permissionless blockchains results in competition over system resources, which needs to be controlled with fees. Ethereum's current fee mechanism is implemented via a first-price auction that results in unpredictable fees…
We study a class of iterative combinatorial auctions which can be viewed as subgradient descent methods for the problem of pricing bundles to balance supply and demand. We provide concrete convergence rates for auctions in this class,…
Classical Bayesian mechanism design relies on the common prior assumption, but such prior is often not available in practice. We study the design of prior-independent mechanisms that relax this assumption: the seller is selling an…
Blockchains offer a decentralized and secure execution environment strong enough to host cryptocurrencies, but the state-replication model makes on-chain computation expensive. To avoid heavy on-chain workloads, systems like Truebit and…
We consider descending price auctions for selling $m$ units of a good to unit demand i.i.d. buyers where there is an exogenous bound of $k$ on the number of price levels the auction clock can take. The auctioneer's problem is to choose…
In 2021 Ethereum adjusted the transaction pricing mechanism by implementing EIP-1559, which introduces the base fee - a network fee that is burned and dynamically adjusts to the network demand. The authors of the Ethereum Improvement…
We consider an online preemptive scheduling problem where jobs with deadlines arrive sporadically. A commitment requirement is imposed such that the scheduler has to either accept or decline a job immediately upon arrival. The scheduler's…
Many auction settings implicitly or explicitly require that bidders are treated equally ex-ante. This may be because discrimination is philosophically or legally impermissible, or because it is practically difficult to implement or…
Small operators who take part in secondary wireless spectrum markets typically have strict budget limits. In this paper, we study the bidding problem of a budget constrained operator in repeated secondary spectrum auctions. In existing…
The Ethereum blockchain as a decentralized platform is so successful that many applications deployed on it. However, for the inherent transparency properties and the lack of privacy, deploying a financial application on top of it is always…
We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…
The participation of electric vehicle (EV) aggregators in real-time electricity markets offers promising revenue opportunities through price-responsive energy arbitrage. A central challenge in economic bidding lies in quantifying the…
In this work, we investigate the online learning problem of revenue maximization in ad auctions, where the seller needs to learn the click-through rates (CTRs) of each ad candidate and charge the price of the winner through a pay-per-click…
We show that Execution Tickets and Execution Auctions dramatically increase centralization in the market for block proposals, even without multi-block MEV concerns. Previous analyses have insufficiently or incorrectly modeled the…