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We study optimal auction design for Maximum Extractable Value (MEV) auction markets on Ethereum. Using a dataset of 2.2 million transactions across three major orderflow providers, we establish three empirical regularities: extracted values…

Trading and Market Microstructure · Quantitative Finance 2026-03-18 Aleksei Adadurov , Sergey Barseghyan , Anton Chtepine , Antero Eloranta , Andrei Sebyakin , Arsenii Valitov

The Ethereum block-building process has changed significantly since the emergence of Proposer-Builder Separation. Validators access blocks through a marketplace, where block builders bid for the right to construct the block and earn MEV…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-03-19 Fei Wu , Thomas Thiery , Stefanos Leonardos , Carmine Ventre

Maximal extractable value (MEV) in which block proposers unethically gain profits by manipulating the order in which transactions are included within a block, is a key challenge facing blockchains such as Ethereum today. Left unchecked, MEV…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2024-05-16 Yifan Mao , Mengya Zhang , Shaileshh Bojja Venkatakrishnan , Zhiqiang Lin

We analyze maximal extractable value in multiple concurrent proposer blockchains, where multiple blocks become data available before their final execution order is determined. This concurrency breaks the single builder assumption of…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-11-18 Steven Landers , Benjamin Marsh

Currently, over 90% of Ethereum blocks are built using MEV-Boost, an auction that allows validators to sell their block-building power to builders who compete in an open English auction in each slot. Shortly after the merge, when MEV-Boost…

Theoretical Economics · Economics 2023-11-16 Mallesh Pai , Max Resnick

In this paper, we take a close look at a problem labeled maximal extractable value (MEV), which arises in a blockchain due to the ability of a block producer to manipulate the order of transactions within a block. Indeed, blockchains such…

General Economics · Economics 2024-03-29 Vijay Mohan , Peyman Khezr

Block production on the Ethereum blockchain has adopted an auction-based mechanism known as Proposer--Builder Separation (PBS), where validators outsource block creation to builders competing in MEV--Boost auctions for Maximal Extractable…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-10-01 Fei Wu , Thomas Thiery , Stefanos Leonardos , Carmine Ventre

The MEV-Boost block auction contributes approximately 90% of all Ethereum blocks. Between October 2023 and March 2024, only three builders produced 80% of them, highlighting the concentration of power within the block builder market. To…

Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science · Computer Science 2024-07-22 Burak Öz , Danning Sui , Thomas Thiery , Florian Matthes

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has become a critical issue for blockchain ecosystems, as it enables validators or block proposers to extract value by ordering, including or censoring users' transactions. This paper aims to present a formal…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-06-30 Bruno Mazorra , Nicolás Della Penna

Validators in permissionless, large-scale blockchains, such as Ethereum, are typically payoff-maximizing, rational actors. Ethereum relies on in-protocol incentives, like rewards for correct and timely votes, to induce honest behavior and…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2025-05-06 Roozbeh Sarenche , Ertem Nusret Tas , Barnabe Monnot , Caspar Schwarz-Schilling , Bart Preneel

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) drives the prosperity of the blockchain ecosystem. By strategically including, excluding, or reordering transactions within blocks, block producers can extract additional value, which in turn incentivizes…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2024-10-11 Tianyang Chi , Ningyu He , Xiaohui Hu , Haoyu Wang

Blockchains protect an ecosystem worth more than $500bn with strong security properties derived from the principle of decentralization. Is today's blockchain decentralized? In this paper, we empirically studied one of the least…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2025-05-01 Sen Yang , Kartik Nayak , Fan Zhang

We study the amount of maximal extractable value (MEV) captured by validators, as a function of searcher competition, in blockchains with competitive block building markets such as Ethereum. We argue that the core is a suitable solution…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-10-01 Akaki Mamageishvili , Christoph Schlegel , Benny Sudakov , Danning Sui

Multi-block MEV (MMEV) denotes the practice of securing k-consecutive blocks in an attempt at extracting surplus value by manipulating transaction ordering. Following the implementation of pro-poser/builder separation (PBS) on Ethereum,…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2023-06-13 Johannes Rude Jensen , Victor von Wachter , Omri Ross

We study the economics of transaction reverts on Ethereum rollups and show that they are not accidental failures but equilibrium outcomes of MEV strategies. Using execution traces from major L2s, we find that over 80% of reverted…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2025-09-23 Krzysztof Gogol , Manvir Schneider , Claudio Tessone

The long-term success of cryptocurrencies largely depends on the incentive compatibility provided to the validators. Bribery attacks, facilitated trustlessly via smart contracts, threaten this foundation. This work introduces, implements,…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2026-01-14 Bence Soóki-Tóth , István András Seres , Kamilla Kara , Ábel Nagy , Balázs Pejó , Gergely Biczók

We provide an economic model of Execution Tickets and use it to study the ability of the Ethereum protocol to capture MEV from block construction. We demonstrate that Execution Tickets extract all MEV when all buyers are homogeneous, risk…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-08-22 Jonah Burian , Davide Crapis , Fahad Saleh

With the emergence of Miner Extractable Value (MEV), block construction markets on blockchains have evolved into a competitive arena. Following Ethereum's transition from Proof of Work (PoW) to Proof of Stake (PoS), the Proposer Builder…

Networking and Internet Architecture · Computer Science 2023-06-06 Anton Wahrstätter , Liyi Zhou , Kaihua Qin , Davor Svetinovic , Arthur Gervais

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) represents a pivotal challenge within the Ethereum ecosystem; it impacts the fairness, security, and efficiency of both Layer 1 (L1) and Layer 2 (L2) networks. MEV arises when miners or validators manipulate…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2025-01-28 Zeinab Alipanahloo , Abdelhakim Senhaji Hafid , Kaiwen Zhang

Cryptocurrency miners have great latitude in deciding which transactions they accept, including their own, and the order in which they accept them. Ethereum miners in particular use this flexibility to collect MEV-Miner Extractable Value-by…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2022-03-31 Julien Piet , Jaiden Fairoze , Nicholas Weaver
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