Related papers: Securing LLM Agents Need Intent-to-Execution Integ…

Security in LLM agents is inherently contextual. For example, the same action taken by an agent may represent legitimate behavior or a security violation depending on whose instruction led to the action, what objective is being pursued, and…

Autonomous agents based on large language models (LLMs) are rapidly emerging as a general-purpose technology, with recent systems such as OpenClaw extending their capabilities through broad tool use, third-party skills, and deeper…

Autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, exemplified by OpenClaw, demonstrate remarkable capabilities in executing complex, long-horizon tasks. However, their tightly coupled instant-messaging interaction paradigm and high-privilege…

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly being deployed as conversational assistants capable of performing complex real-world tasks through tool integration. This enhanced ability to interact with external systems and process…

AI agents, predominantly powered by large language models (LLMs), are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection, in which malicious instructions embedded in untrusted data can trigger dangerous agent actions. This position paper discusses our…

Agentic computing systems, while immensely capable, raise serious security, privacy, and safety concerns. A key issue is that the full set of functionalities offered by these systems, combined with their probabilistic execution flows, is…

Tool-augmented Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated impressive capabilities in automating complex, multi-step real-world tasks, yet remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Adversaries exploit this weakness by…

Prompt injection attacks represent a major vulnerability in Large Language Model (LLM) deployments, where malicious instructions embedded in user inputs can override system prompts and induce unintended behaviors. This paper presents a…

Current evaluations of tool-integrated LLM agents typically focus on end-to-end tool-usage evaluation while neglecting their stability. This limits their real-world applicability, as various internal or external factors can cause agents to…

High-privilege LLM agents that autonomously process external documentation are increasingly trusted to automate tasks by reading and executing project instructions, yet they are granted terminal access, filesystem control, and outbound…

Large Language Models (LLMs) are combined with tools to create powerful LLM agents that provide a wide range of services. Unlike traditional software, LLM agent's behavior is determined at runtime by natural language prompts from either…

LLM agents process trusted instructions, retrieved records, and tool observations through a common generative channel. This conflates data flow with authority: an untrusted string can affect a secret-bearing response or an action proposal…

Defenses against indirect prompt injection (IPI) in tool-using LLM agents share two structural weaknesses. First, they all attempt to prevent attacks rather than detect the compromises that slip through. Second, they have only been…

LLM-based agents have recently attracted significant attention due to their ability to autonomously invoke relevant tools to accomplish complex tasks. However, recent studies have shown that these agents face severe security risks, which…

This position paper argues that enforcing LLM agent safety within a single abstraction layer is not merely suboptimal but categorically insufficient for deployed LLM agents -- a structural consequence of how agent execution works, not a…

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been increasingly integrated into computer-use agents, which can autonomously operate tools on a user's computer to accomplish complex tasks. However, due to the inherently unstable and unpredictable nature…

Autonomous agent frameworks built upon large language models (LLMs) are evolving into complex, tool-integrated, and continuously operating systems, introducing security risks beyond traditional prompt-level vulnerabilities. As this paradigm…

Credible safety plans for advanced AI development require methods to verify agent behavior and detect potential control deficiencies early. A fundamental aspect is ensuring agents adhere to safety-critical principles, especially when these…

Tool-using LLM agents must act on untrusted webpages, emails, files, and API outputs while issuing privileged tool calls. Existing defenses often mediate trust at the granularity of an entire tool invocation, forcing a brittle choice in…

Autonomous agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being utilized in complex software systems. However, reliability remains a significant challenge due to unpredictable failures such as hallucinations, execution…