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Deploying large language model (LLM) agents in shared environments introduces a fundamental tension between individual alignment and collective stability: locally rational decisions can impose negative externalities that degrade…

A critical challenge in modelling Heterogeneous-Agent Teams is training agents to collaborate with teammates whose policies are inaccessible or non-stationary, such as humans. Traditional approaches rely on expensive human-in-the-loop data,…

Measuring long-run LLM outcomes (user satisfaction, expert judgment, downstream KPIs) is expensive. Teams default to cheap LLM judges, but uncalibrated proxies can invert rankings entirely. Causal Judge Evaluation (CJE) makes it affordable…

The Automated Model Evaluation (AutoEval) framework entertains the possibility of evaluating a trained machine learning model without resorting to a labeled testing set. Despite the promise and some decent results, the existing AutoEval…

Training multi-agent systems (MAS) to achieve realistic equilibria gives us a useful tool to understand and model real-world systems. We consider a general sum partially observable Markov game where agents of different types share a single…

As foundation models are increasingly deployed as interacting agents in multi-agent systems, their collective behavior raises new challenges for trustworthiness, transparency, and accountability. Traditional coordination mechanisms, such as…

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate significant potential in multi-agent negotiation tasks, yet evaluation in this domain remains challenging due to a lack of robust and generalizable benchmarks. Abdelnabi et al. (2024) introduce a…

Recent techniques based on Mean Field Games (MFGs) allow the scalable analysis of multi-player games with many similar, rational agents. However, standard MFGs remain limited to homogeneous players that weakly influence each other, and…

Adaptive machines have the potential to assist or interfere with human behavior in a range of contexts, from cognitive decision-making to physical device assistance. Therefore it is critical to understand how machine learning algorithms can…

In the context of multi-agent systems, the rational verification problem is concerned with checking which temporal logic properties will hold in a system when its constituent agents are assumed to behave rationally and strategically in…

Mean field games (MFGs) tractably model behavior in large agent populations. The literature on learning MFG equilibria typically focuses on finding Nash equilibria (NE), which assume perfectly rational agents and are hence implausible in…

Question answering (QA) can only make progress if we know if an answer is correct, but for many of the most challenging and interesting QA examples, current evaluation metrics to determine answer equivalence (AE) often do not align with…

Eliciting cooperation in multi-agent LLM systems is critical for AI alignment. We investigate two approaches: direct communication and curriculum learning. In a 4-player Stag Hunt, a one-word "cheap talk" channel increases cooperation from…

We consider the problem of incentivising desirable behaviours in multi-agent systems by way of taxation schemes. Our study employs the concurrent games model: in this model, each agent is primarily motivated to seek the satisfaction of a…

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) lies at the heart of a plethora of applications involving the interaction of a group of agents in a shared unknown environment. A prominent framework for studying MARL is Markov games, with the goal…

Large Language Models (LLMs) are pretrained on extensive multilingual corpora to acquire both language-specific cultural knowledge and general knowledge. Ideally, while LLMs should provide consistent responses to culture-independent…

While the advancement of large language models has spurred the development of AI agents to automate tasks, numerous use cases inherently require agents to collaborate with humans due to humans' latent preferences, domain expertise, or the…

In common-interest stochastic games all players receive an identical payoff. Players participating in such games must learn to coordinate with each other in order to receive the highest-possible value. A number of reinforcement learning…

We develop a game-theoretic framework for predicting and steering the behavior of populations of large language models (LLMs) through Nash equilibrium (NE) analysis. To avoid the intractability of equilibrium computation in open-ended text…

We introduce \textsc{Cattle Trade, a multi-agent benchmark for evaluating large language models (LLMs) as agents in strategic reasoning under imperfect information, adversarial interaction, and resource constraints. The benchmark combines…