Related papers: The Granularity Mismatch in Agent Security: Argume…

LLM-based agents are increasingly deployed in high-stakes scenarios such as email management, financial transactions, and code execution, where they interact with the external world through tool calling. During execution, these agents must…

Agentic computing systems, while immensely capable, raise serious security, privacy, and safety concerns. A key issue is that the full set of functionalities offered by these systems, combined with their probabilistic execution flows, is…

LLM agents process trusted instructions, retrieved records, and tool observations through a common generative channel. This conflates data flow with authority: an untrusted string can affect a secret-bearing response or an action proposal…

Verifying LLM-generated systems code is hard: bugs are prevalent, formal specifications are missing, and safety contracts are encoded implicitly at call sites rather than enforced at function boundaries. We propose agentic model checking, a…

The rise of Large Language Model (LLM) agents, augmented with tool use, skills, and external knowledge, has introduced new security risks. Among them, prompt injection attacks, where adversaries embed malicious instructions into the agent…

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on external tools and retrieval systems to autonomously complete complex tasks. However, this design exposes agents to indirect prompt injection (IPI), where attacker-controlled context…

Large Language Models (LLMs) and other foundation models are increasingly used as the core of AI agents. In agentic workflows, these agents plan tasks, interact with humans and peers, and influence scientific outcomes across federated and…

Powerful autonomous systems, which reason, plan, and converse using and between numerous tools and agents, are made possible by Large Language Models (LLMs), Vision-Language Models (VLMs), and new agentic AI systems, like LangChain and…

The software supply chain attacks are becoming more and more focused on trusted development and delivery procedures, so the conventional post-build integrity mechanisms cannot be used anymore. The available frameworks like SLSA, SBOM and in…

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly being deployed as conversational assistants capable of performing complex real-world tasks through tool integration. This enhanced ability to interact with external systems and process…

Security in LLM agents is inherently contextual. For example, the same action taken by an agent may represent legitimate behavior or a security violation depending on whose instruction led to the action, what objective is being pursued, and…

Tool-augmented Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated impressive capabilities in automating complex, multi-step real-world tasks, yet remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Adversaries exploit this weakness by…

Tool-calling LLM agents can read private data, invoke external services, and trigger real-world actions, creating a security problem at the point of tool execution. We identify a denial-feedback leakage pattern, which we term causality…

This position paper argues that securing LLM agents requires first defining an end-to-end correctness property that specifies when an agent's execution faithfully reflects the user's intent. Modern LLM agents operate over an…

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been increasingly integrated into computer-use agents, which can autonomously operate tools on a user's computer to accomplish complex tasks. However, due to the inherently unstable and unpredictable nature…

Modern AI agents execute real-world side effects through tool calls such as file operations, shell commands, HTTP requests, and database queries. A single unsafe action, including accidental deletion, credential exposure, or data…

Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) have caused significant losses across a wide range of sectors, including the theft of sensitive data and harm to system integrity. As attack techniques grow increasingly sophisticated and stealthy, the…

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly used to automate complex workflows, but integrating untrusted external data with privileged execution exposes them to severe security risks, particularly direct and indirect prompt…

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into real-world applications, from virtual assistants to autonomous agents. However, their flexibility also introduces new attack vectors-particularly Prompt Injection (PI), where…

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems, where a fundamental task is mapping user intents to relevant external tools. Errors in tool selection can have severe outcomes, such as unauthorized data access,…