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Related papers: Secret Communication with Plausible Deniability

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We consider the scenario wherein Alice wants to (potentially) communicate to the intended receiver Bob over a network consisting of multiple parallel links in the presence of a passive eavesdropper Willie, who observes an unknown subset of…

Information Theory · Computer Science 2014-01-30 Swanand Kadhe , Sidharth Jaggi , Mayank Bakshi , Alex Sprintson

In this paper, we introduce the notion of Plausible Deniability in an information theoretic framework. We consider a scenario where an entity that eavesdrops through a broadcast channel summons one of the parties in a communication protocol…

Information Theory · Computer Science 2017-05-16 Mayank Bakshi , Vinod Prabhakaran

Agents receive private signals about an unknown state. The resulting joint belief distributions are complex and lack a simple characterization. Our key insight is that, when conditioned on the state, the structure of belief distributions…

Theoretical Economics · Economics 2024-11-19 Itai Arieli , Yakov Babichenko , Fedor Sandomirskiy

Covert communication allows us to transmit messages in such a way that it is not possible to detect that the communication is occurring. This provides protection in situations where knowledge that people are talking to each other may be…

Quantum Physics · Physics 2018-02-28 Juan Miguel Arrazola , Ryan Amiri

We propose a new notion of credibility for Bayesian persuasion problems. A disclosure policy is credible if the sender cannot profit from tampering with her messages while keeping the message distribution unchanged. We show that the…

Theoretical Economics · Economics 2022-05-10 Xiao Lin , Ce Liu

Political and advertising campaigns increasingly exploit social networks to spread information and persuade people. This paper studies a persuasion model to examine whether such a strategy is better than simply sending public signals.…

Theoretical Economics · Economics 2025-08-12 Yifan Zhang

We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…

Theoretical Economics · Economics 2024-03-22 Alistair Barton

We study a Bayesian persuasion setting in which a sender wants to persuade a critical mass of receivers by revealing partial information about the state to them. The homogeneous binary-action receivers are located on a communication…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-09-12 Toygar T. Kerman , Anastas P. Tenev , Konstantin Zabarnyi

We consider the problem of covert communication over a state-dependent channel when the channel state is available either non-causally, causally, or strictly causally, either at the transmitter alone or at both transmitter and receiver.…

Information Theory · Computer Science 2021-05-24 Hassan ZivariFard , Matthieu R. Bloch , Aria Nosratinia

This paper considers the problem of covert communication with mismatched decoding, in which a sender wishes to reliably communicate with a receiver whose decoder is fixed and possibly sub-optimal, and simultaneously to ensure that the…

Information Theory · Computer Science 2021-11-11 Qiaosheng Zhang , Vincent Y. F. Tan

The celebrated Bayesian persuasion model considers strategic communication between an informed agent (the sender) and uninformed decision makers (the receivers). The current rapidly-growing literature mostly assumes a dichotomy: either the…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2022-03-16 Yakov Babichenko , Inbal Talgam-Cohen , Haifeng Xu , Konstantin Zabarnyi

We consider a 1-to-$K$ communication scenario, where a source transmits private messages to $K$ receivers through a broadcast erasure channel, and the receivers feed back strictly causally and publicly their channel states after each…

Information Theory · Computer Science 2014-08-11 László Czap , Vinod M. Prabhakaran , Christina Fragouli , Suhas Diggavi

We consider the problem of covert communication over a state-dependent channel, where the transmitter has causal or noncausal knowledge of the channel states. Here, "covert" means that a warden on the channel should observe similar…

Information Theory · Computer Science 2017-08-09 Si-Hyeon Lee , Ligong Wang , Ashish Khisti , Gregory W. Wornell

A transmitter Alice may wish to reliably transmit a message to a receiver Bob over a binary symmetric channel (BSC), while simultaneously ensuring that her transmission is deniable from an eavesdropper Willie. That is, if Willie listening…

Information Theory · Computer Science 2016-07-12 Pak Hou Che , Mayank Bakshi , Sidharth Jaggi

A novel private communication framework is proposed where privacy is induced by transmitting over a channel instances of linear inverse problems that are identifiable to the legitimate receiver but unidentifiable to an eavesdropper. The gap…

Information Theory · Computer Science 2024-07-24 Maxime Ferreira Da Costa , Jianxiu Li , Urbashi Mitra

We investigate the problem of information theoretically secure communication in a line network with erasure channels and state feedback. We consider a spectrum of cases for the private randomness that intermediate nodes can generate,…

Information Theory · Computer Science 2014-07-09 Athanasios Papadopoulos , Laszlo Czap , Christina Fragouli

Secrecy in communication systems is measured herein by the distortion that an adversary incurs. The transmitter and receiver share secret key, which they use to encrypt communication and ensure distortion at an adversary. A model is…

Information Theory · Computer Science 2015-04-14 Curt Schieler , Paul Cuff

Covert communication is the undetected transmission of sensitive information over a communication channel. In wireless communication systems, channel impairments such as signal fading present challenges in the effective implementation and…

Information Theory · Computer Science 2025-09-29 Amir Reza Ramtin , Dennis Goeckel , Don Towsley

We model the communication of narratives as a cheap-talk game under model uncertainty. The sender has private information about the true data generating process of publicly observable data. The receiver is uncertain about how to interpret…

Theoretical Economics · Economics 2025-07-09 Gerrit Bauch , Manuel Foerster

We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full…

Theoretical Economics · Economics 2020-12-11 Anton Kolotilin , Hongyi Li
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