Related papers: A Single Neuron Is Sufficient to Bypass Safety Ali…
We discover a novel and surprising phenomenon of unintentional misalignment in reasoning language models (RLMs), which we call self-jailbreaking. Specifically, after benign reasoning training on math or code domains, RLMs will use multiple…
Safety guardrails in large language models(LLMs) are developed to prevent malicious users from generating toxic content at a large scale. However, these measures can inadvertently introduce or reflect new biases, as LLMs may refuse to…
Safety alignment is indispensable for Large Language Models (LLMs) to defend threats from malicious instructions. However, recent researches reveal safety-aligned LLMs prone to reject benign queries due to the exaggerated safety issue,…
Current safety alignment methods encode safe behavior implicitly within model parameters, creating a fundamental opacity: we cannot easily inspect why a model refuses a request, nor intervene when its safety judgments fail. We propose Safe…
Large Language Models have demonstrated remarkable capabilities on multiple-choice question answering benchmarks, but the complex mechanisms underlying their large-scale neurons remain opaque, posing significant challenges for understanding…
A key component of building safe and reliable language models is enabling the models to appropriately refuse to follow certain instructions or answer certain questions. We may want models to output refusal messages for various categories of…
Safety alignment is crucial for large language models (LLMs) to resist malicious instructions but often results in over-refusals, where benign prompts are unnecessarily rejected, impairing user experience and model utility. We introduce…
As vision-language models (VLMs) become increasingly capable, maintaining a balance between safety and usefulness remains a central challenge. Safety mechanisms, while essential, can backfire, causing over-refusal, where models decline…
While many studies have shown that linguistic information is encoded in hidden word representations, few have studied individual neurons, to show how and in which neurons it is encoded. Among these, the common approach is to use an external…
Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong performance on complex reasoning tasks but often generate harmful responses to malicious user queries. This paper investigates the underlying cause of these safety risks and shows that the issue…
Refusal behavior in large language models (LLMs) enables them to decline responding to harmful, unethical, or inappropriate prompts, ensuring alignment with ethical standards. This paper investigates refusal behavior across six LLMs from…
A key concern with the concept of "alignment" is the implicit question of "alignment to what?". AI systems are increasingly used across the world, yet safety alignment is often focused on homogeneous monolingual settings. Additionally,…
Safety-aligned language models refuse harmful requests through learned refusal behaviors encoded in their internal representations. Recent activation-based jailbreaking methods circumvent these safety mechanisms by applying orthogonal…
Large language models are now tuned to align with the goals of their creators, namely to be "helpful and harmless." These models should respond helpfully to user questions, but refuse to answer requests that could cause harm. However,…
Language models can be persuaded to abandon factual knowledge. This vulnerability is central to AI safety, but its internal mechanism remains poorly understood. We uncover a compact causal mechanism for persuasion-induced factual errors. A…
Natural language is an appealing medium for explaining how large language models process and store information, but evaluating the faithfulness of such explanations is challenging. To help address this, we develop two modes of evaluation…
Ensuring robust safety alignment while preserving utility is critical for the reliable deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, current techniques fundamentally suffer from intertwined deficiencies: insufficient robustness…
The progress of AI systems such as large language models (LLMs) raises increasingly pressing concerns about their safe deployment. This paper examines the value alignment problem for LLMs, arguing that current alignment strategies are…
Evaluating aligned large language models' (LLMs) ability to recognize and reject unsafe user requests is crucial for safe, policy-compliant deployments. Existing evaluation efforts, however, face three limitations that we address with…
Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) undergo safety alignment to suppress harmful content. However, current defenses predominantly target explicit malicious patterns in the input representation, often overlooking the vulnerabilities…