Related papers: Toward Optimal Regret in Robust Pricing: Decouplin…
Dynamic pricing of goods in a competitive environment to maximize revenue is a natural objective and has been a subject of research over the years. In this paper, we focus on a class of markets exhibiting the substitutes property with…
Feature-based dynamic pricing is an increasingly popular model of setting prices for highly differentiated products with applications in digital marketing, online sales, real estate and so on. The problem was formally studied as an online…
We consider dynamic pricing with covariates under a generalized linear demand model: a seller can dynamically adjust the price of a product over a horizon of $T$ time periods, and at each time period $t$, the demand of the product is…
This paper considers two fundamental sequential decision-making problems: the problem of prediction with expert advice and the multi-armed bandit problem. We focus on stochastic regimes in which an adversary may corrupt losses, and we…
In contextual dynamic pricing, a seller sequentially prices goods based on contextual information. Buyers will purchase products only if the prices are below their valuations. The goal of the seller is to design a pricing strategy that…
Motivated by pricing in ad exchange markets, we consider the problem of robust learning of reserve prices against strategic buyers in repeated contextual second-price auctions. Buyers' valuations for an item depend on the context that…
We investigate online pricing in two-sided markets where a platform repeatedly posts prices based on binary accept/reject feedback to maximize gains-from-trade (GFT) or profit. We characterize the regret achievable across three mechanism…
Bilateral trade, a fundamental topic in economics, models the problem of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they hold private valuations. In this paper, we cast the bilateral…
We study dynamic pricing where a seller repeatedly interacts with a strategic, non-myopic buyer who has a fixed private valuation and discounts future utility. Prior work focused exclusively on posted-price mechanisms, which only extract…
We study the pricing problem faced by a firm that sells a large number of products, described via a wide range of features, to customers that arrive over time. Customers independently make purchasing decisions according to a general choice…
We study episodic reinforcement learning under unknown adversarial corruptions in both the rewards and the transition probabilities of the underlying system. We propose new algorithms which, compared to the existing results in (Lykouris et…
Bilateral trade models the problem of intermediating between two rational agents -- a seller and a buyer -- both characterized by a private valuation for an item they want to trade. We study the online learning version of the problem, in…
We study predictive control in a setting where the dynamics are time-varying and linear, and the costs are time-varying and well-conditioned. At each time step, the controller receives the exact predictions of costs, dynamics, and…
We study the problem of learning to bid when the bidder's value is dynamic, i.e., when the current value depends on past outcomes. Specifically, we consider a bidder participating in repeated second-price auctions whose value depends on the…
We study the linear contextual bandit problem in the presence of adversarial corruption, where the interaction between the player and a possibly infinite decision set is contaminated by an adversary that can corrupt the reward up to a…
We study repeated bilateral trade when the valuations of the sellers and the buyers are contextual. More precisely, the agents' valuations are given by the inner product of a context vector with two unknown $d$-dimensional vectors -- one…
This paper addresses online learning with ``corrupted'' feedback. Our learner is provided with potentially corrupted gradients $\tilde g_t$ instead of the ``true'' gradients $g_t$. We make no assumptions about how the corruptions arise:…
We study online learning in repeated first-price auctions where a bidder, only observing the winning bid at the end of each auction, learns to adaptively bid in order to maximize her cumulative payoff. To achieve this goal, the bidder faces…
Motivated by posted price auctions where buyers are grouped in an unknown number of latent types characterized by their private values for the good on sale, we investigate revenue maximization in stochastic dynamic pricing when the…
We develop a model selection approach to tackle reinforcement learning with adversarial corruption in both transition and reward. For finite-horizon tabular MDPs, without prior knowledge on the total amount of corruption, our algorithm…