Related papers: Zero-determinant Strategy for Moving Target Defens…
We consider a class of hierarchical multi-agent optimization problems over networks where agents seek to compute an approximate solution to a single-stage stochastic mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). MPECs subsume…
The intrinsic, sampling, and enforced zero dynamics attacks (ZDAs) are among the most detrimental stealthy attacks in robotics, aerospace, and cyber-physical systems. They exploit internal dynamics, discretization, redundancy/asynchronous…
We study automated intrusion prevention using reinforcement learning. Following a novel approach, we formulate the interaction between an attacker and a defender as an optimal stopping game and let attack and defense strategies evolve…
In this paper, we are concerned with the stabilizatbility of Stackelberg game-based systems. In particular, two players are involved in the system where one is the follower to minimize the related cost function and the other is the leader…
We consider a variant of the target defense problem where a single defender is tasked to capture a sequence of incoming intruders. The intruders' objective is to breach the target boundary without being captured by the defender. As soon as…
In this paper, the problem of self-organizing, correlation-aware clustering is studied for a dense network of machine-type devices (MTDs) deployed over a cellular network. In dense machine-to-machine networks, MTDs are typically located…
A scenario is considered wherein a stationary, turn constrained agent (Turret) and a mobile agent (Defender) cooperate to protect the former from an adversarial mobile agent (Attacker). The Attacker wishes to reach the Turret prior to…
Asynchronous action coordination presents a pervasive challenge in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS), which can be represented as a Stackelberg game (SG). However, the scalability of existing Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) methods based…
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time Stackelberg mean field game with a leader and an infinite number of followers. The leader and the followers each observe types privately that evolve as conditionally independent controlled Markov…
This paper studies the sensor placement problem in a networked control system for improving its security against cyber-physical attacks. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game between an attacker and a detector. The attacker's…
Microsoft Active Directory (AD) is the default security management system for Window domain network. We study the problem of placing decoys in AD network to detect potential attacks. We model the problem as a Stackelberg game between an…
This paper studies the dynamic pricing mechanism for data products in demand-driven markets through a game-theoretic framework. We develop a three-tier Stackelberg game model to capture the hierarchical strategic interactions among key…
Measuring and promoting policy diversity is critical for solving games with strong non-transitive dynamics where strategic cycles exist, and there is no consistent winner (e.g., Rock-Paper-Scissors). With that in mind, maintaining a pool of…
There has been a recent surge in single-step adversarial training as it shows robustness and efficiency. However, a phenomenon referred to as ``catastrophic overfitting" has been observed, which is prevalent in single-step defenses and may…
We consider an autonomous navigation problem, whereby a traveler aims at traversing an environment in which an adversary tries to set an ambush. A two players zero sum game is introduced. Players' strategies are computed as random path…
In this paper an N-pursuer vs. M-evader team conflict is studied. The differential game of border defense is addressed and we focus on the game of degree in the region of the state space where the pursuers are able to win. This work extends…
Tri-level defender-attacker game models are a well-studied method for determining how best to protect a system (e.g., a transportation network) from attacks. Existing models assume that defender and attacker actions have a perfect effect,…
The increasing connectivity and intricate remote access environment have made traditional perimeter-based network defense vulnerable. Zero trust becomes a promising approach to provide defense policies based on agent-centric trust…
We present a resource-planning game for cyber-security of networked control systems (NCS). The NCS is assumed to be operating in closed-loop using a linear state-feedback $\mathcal{H}_2$ controller. A zero-sum, two-player Stackelberg game…
In iterated games, a player can unilaterally exert influence over the outcome through a careful choice of strategy. A powerful class of such "payoff control" strategies was discovered by Press and Dyson (2012). Their so-called…