Related papers: Narrow Secret Loyalty Dodges Black-Box Audits
Backdoor attacks pose a significant threat to neural networks, enabling adversaries to manipulate model outputs on specific inputs, often with devastating consequences, especially in critical applications. While backdoor attacks have been…
We study the feasibility of conducting alignment audits: investigations into whether models have undesired objectives. As a testbed, we train a language model with a hidden objective. Our training pipeline first teaches the model about…
Machine learning systems are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where attackers manipulate model behavior through data tampering or architectural modifications. Traditional backdoor attacks involve injecting malicious samples with specific…
Reinforcement learning (RL) has achieved remarkable success across diverse domains, enabling autonomous systems to learn and adapt to dynamic environments by optimizing a reward function. However, this reliance on reward signals creates a…
How much does a machine learning algorithm leak about its training data, and why? Membership inference attacks are used as an auditing tool to quantify this leakage. In this paper, we present a comprehensive \textit{hypothesis testing…
These days, deep learning models have achieved great success in multiple fields, from autonomous driving to medical diagnosis. These models have expanded the abilities of artificial intelligence by offering great solutions to complex…
Despite being prevalent in the general field of Natural Language Processing (NLP), pre-trained language models inherently carry privacy and copyright concerns due to their nature of training on large-scale web-scraped data. In this paper,…
Local fine-tuning datasets routinely contain sensitive secrets such as API keys, personal identifiers, and financial records. Although ''local offline fine-tuning'' is often viewed as a privacy boundary, we reveal that compromised model…
Even when a tool is explicitly described as unfair and harmful to others, ostensibly safety-aligned LLM agents still voluntarily engage in secret collusion whenever doing so confers a strategic advantage. To investigate this phenomenon, we…
Federated learning distributes model training among a multitude of agents, who, guided by privacy concerns, perform training using their local data but share only model parameter updates, for iterative aggregation at the server. In this…
Distributed learning is central for large-scale training of deep-learning models. However, they are exposed to a security threat in which Byzantine participants can interrupt or control the learning process. Previous attack models and their…
We systematically evaluate the quality of widely used adversarial safety datasets from two perspectives: in isolation and in practice. In isolation, we examine how well these datasets reflect real-world adversarial attacks based on three…
Machine unlearning has emerged as a key component in ensuring ``Right to be Forgotten'', enabling the removal of specific data points from trained models. However, even when the unlearning is performed without poisoning the forget-set…
Black-box finetuning is an emerging interface for adapting state-of-the-art language models to user needs. However, such access may also let malicious actors undermine model safety. To demonstrate the challenge of defending finetuning…
We introduce AuditBench, an alignment auditing benchmark. AuditBench consists of 56 language models with implanted hidden behaviors. Each model has one of 14 concerning behaviors--such as sycophantic deference, opposition to AI regulation,…
Membership inference (MI) attacks exploit the fact that machine learning algorithms sometimes leak information about their training data through the learned model. In this work, we study membership inference in the white-box setting in…
Recent studies on backdoor attacks in model training have shown that polluting a small portion of training data is sufficient to produce incorrect manipulated predictions on poisoned test-time data while maintaining high clean accuracy in…
LLMs are increasingly capable of persuasion, which raises the question of how to protect users against manipulation. In a preregistered user study (N=120) across four decision-making scenarios, we find that an adversarial LLM with a hidden…
Latent-space monitors aim to detect undesirable behaviours in Large Language Models by leveraging their internal representations rather than relying solely on black-box outputs. These methods have shown promise in identifying behaviours…
Recent studies revealed that deep learning is susceptible to backdoor poisoning attacks. An adversary can embed a hidden backdoor into a model to manipulate its predictions by only modifying a few training data, without controlling the…